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THE CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
TWO-STEP
Carliss N. Chatman*
The corporation cannot exist without its founders complying explicitly with
the requirements for incorporation provided by state statutes. The artificial entity
theory acknowledges that the corporation cannot and will not exist until its
founders comply explicitly with the requirements for corporate formation and incorporation imposed by the state. A corporation is also, by design, a new and distinct entity divorced from its people. The real entity theory acknowledges that
once a corporation is formed, it has rights that belong only to the corporation itself, wholly separate from its founders. By merging the artificial entity and real
entity theories, the Court may properly define corporate rights.
Because of the dual nature of the corporation, corporate personhood should
be a question of fact, not a matter of law. Corporate personhood requires weighing the evidence and making a case-by-case determination based on the choices
made at formation and how the corporation operates. To determine a corporation’s rights the Court should engage in a two-step analysis that gives deference
to this duality. The Court should first rely on how the corporation is defined by
statute to determine whether it is required to acknowledge the existence of the
right for the corporation itself, then decide whether state action infringes on that
right if it exists. Problems arise in corporate personhood jurisprudence when the
courts give rights to corporations that states, legislatures, and founders did not
intend.
When granting corporations constitutional rights based on the rights of
founders and shareholders in the aggregate, the Court is ignoring the parameters
of the state law definition of the corporation, as well as the affirmative choices of
corporate founders who deliberately chose the corporation over other forms of
business. Citizens United and Hobby Lobby are recent examples of this disregard of corporate statutes for the sake of protecting the rights of the people who
make up the corporation.1 Engaging in a two-step analysis shows that it is impossible for a corporation to be an association of citizens, which is contrary to the
commentary in those court decisions.
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1
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (Hobby Lobby), 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014);
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
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INTRODUCTION
Corporations are defined by state law, and have rights incidental to that status. Corporations also have rights defined by statutes. Because corporations are
not naturally occurring, corporate constitutional rights should be analyzed within the parameters of how the corporation is defined and how the corporation
operates. When courts issue decisions that define corporate rights without first
defining the corporate person, they may unintentionally alter what it means to
be a corporation.2 When the Supreme Court gives consideration to the rights of
the people who make up the corporation, it lays the framework for a corporate
personhood doctrine that relies on the sanctity of constitutional rights for hu-

2

See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (Free exercise includes protection of the religious
liberties of the humans who own and control those companies). Once the corporation is defined as equal to natural persons for one constitutional right, and once the Court discourages
drawing distinctions between who is exercising the right as is suggested in Citizens United,
the Court may be required to extend the analysis to other constitutional rights. See Carliss N.
Chatman, Judgment Without Notice: The Unconstitutionality of Constructive Notice Following Citizens United, 105 KY. L.J. 49, 76–78 (2016) (analyzing the danger of applying Citizens United to Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 253 (2014).
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man beings.3 This is both a conflation of the various business entities as well as
a false equivalency between corporations and natural persons, which is outside
of the scope of how the state defines the corporation. As a result, corporate personhood and constitutional rights derived solely from the rights of the people
who make up the corporation are outside of the scope of what the corporate
founders intended when choosing the corporate form.
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby are recent examples of how this dismissal of corporate statutes for the sake of protecting the rights of the people who
make up the corporation creates a precedent that can have dangerous and unintended consequences.4 Courts have accepted the rights of corporations as a
foregone conclusion based in part on a flawed understanding of corporate formation and governance.5 The courts have ignored the parameters for corporate
existence laid out by the individual states, the choices made by corporate
founders at formation, and the ways in which corporate operations differ from
other forms of business, treating the corporation as legal equals to human beings in a variety of contexts without a satisfactory justification in the law.6 This
article will argue that to properly determine corporate rights, courts must engage in a two-step analysis. In step one, they must properly define the corporation by reviewing how the corporation is defined by statute and how the corporation operates. This helps to determine whether the state is required to
acknowledge the existence of the right for the corporation itself. Then, in step
two they must decide whether an action infringes on that right.
3

See Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and
Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 505–06 (2011)
(The law “deals with corporations in a cumbersome and often inconsistent way.”).
4
See, e.g., Stefan J. Padfield, A New Social Contract: Corporate Personality Theory and the
Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 363, 376–77 (2017) (“[T]his exercise
matters . . . because decisions like Hobby Lobby and Citizens United . . . are essentially increasing corporate subsidies by strengthening corporate rights against state regulation. A
corporate personality theory analysis can explain how the Supreme Court is justifying these
decisions, while at the same time exposing serious flaws in the analysis.”); see also Amicus
Curiae Brief of Corp. & Criminal Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 3–8, Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (Nos. 13-354 & 13-356) (Treating corporations as persons to exercising religion under RFRA contradicts basic tenets of corporate law).
5
See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1503 (1989) (The Court’s analysis of corporate rights is a “situational practice.”); Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of
Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 98 (2014) (“What theory explains why corporations
have some constitutional rights and not others? The Supreme Court has not offered a general
theory.”); Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639,
642–43 (2016) [hereinafter Pollman, Constitutionalizing] (Recent decisions have created a
“new reliance on state corporate law that gives governance rules a quasi-constitutional dimension that was not originally part of their DNA.”); Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right
to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 32 (2014) [hereinafter Pollman, Right to Privacy] (arguing
that “the Court has not developed a coherent method or test for” determining which rights
corporations hold).
6
See sources cited supra note 5; see, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 292 (1999).
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Corporate personhood analysis cannot end at formation. To fully analyze
corporate rights, courts must properly acknowledge what the corporation is after it is formed, and engage in a fact-based analysis of what the corporation is
intended to be. The issue of corporate personhood cannot be resolved by simply
declaring, “corporations are people” or “corporations can never be people” because both statements are true. The corporation is a legal person in various respects, but it is not equal to a human being. Corporations are uniquely positioned socially and economically. A corporation is not a human, not a
manifestation of a document, and not a state actor. A new theoretical framework is required to give proper acknowledgment to the corporate form. Starting
at step one provides that framework. When starting at step one, the courts will
be required to acknowledge corporate duality as represented by the artificial
entity and real entity theories.
Throughout this Article, I will utilize the following hypothetical to illustrate the difference between the Court’s current approach to corporate rights
and an appropriate two-step analysis:
Imagine a family so committed to their faith that they apply its principles to every aspect of their lives, including the family business. The family owns and operates five boutique hotels through their company, Ruby Hospitality Partners
(“Ruby Partners”). As Hindus, they are vegetarians and do not allow employees
to consume any animal flesh on the premises. They also only serve vegetarian
food in the hotel restaurants. Ruby Partners’ vegetarian policy and the reason
behind it is displayed in the restaurants, on hotel receipts, and in promotional literature. After decades of successful business, the family is concerned with ensuring that the business can survive after they are gone. The company gains the
attention of a venture capitalist, who provides the funding to make the upgrades
necessary to help Ruby Hospitality transition to a corporation and go public.
They incorporate under the provisions of Delaware law, and choose to incorporate for all allowable business purposes. Although the new company, Ruby Hospitality, Inc. (“Ruby, Inc.”), is publicly traded, the family members stay on as
the initial board of directors and all initial officers adhere to the Hindu faith and
intend to maintain the vegetarian policy. Shortly after Ruby, Inc. goes public, an
employee files suit for discrimination, alleging a medical need to consume animal products. In defense, Ruby, Inc. claims that banning meat is a tenet of the
corporation’s faith, and to allow meat on the premises would infringe on its exercise of religion.

The holdings of Citizens United7 and Hobby Lobby8 would allow Ruby,
Inc. to assert the religious rights of the people who make up Ruby, even to the
point of discrimination against employees.9 To reach this conclusion, the Court
7

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2010).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
9
In August 2016, a federal judge in Michigan applied the Hobby Lobby holding to conclude
that the religious beliefs of a Detroit-based funeral home allowed the company to fire a
transgender employee who wished to dress as a woman without consequence. As a result, the
former employee, Aimee Stephens, was not allowed to join a discrimination lawsuit initiated
by the EEOC. See E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d
8
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would view Ruby, Inc. as a person capable of religious exercise through the
rights of the people who make up Ruby, Inc.10 As a result, Ruby, Inc., an entity
chosen deliberately to be distinct and separate from its founders, is embodied
with rights that only a human being can fully enjoy by virtue of being the creation of natural persons.
The proper approach would first look to what Ruby, Inc. is intended to be
and how the new corporate entity differs from Ruby Partners. By definition
Ruby, Inc. is an artificial entity that does not exist until its founders meet all
requirements for corporate formation imposed by the state. Ruby, Inc. is also a
real, stand-alone entity that is not linked to the existence of its people. By starting at step one and looking at how Ruby, Inc. is defined by the state, Ruby, Inc.
does not have religious rights based on the people who make up Ruby, Inc.
Those people have chosen to divorce themselves from the business in exchange
for the many benefits of corporate existence. To allow Ruby, Inc. to have freedom to exercise religion, step one requires looking at whether Ruby, Inc. itself
was created to engage in religion, has a right to engage in religion based on
how it is defined by corporate statute, or if the practice of religion is incidental
to its corporate existence.
The courts may also look to whether Ruby, Inc.’s activities are representative of the practice of religion or if Ruby, Inc., through representative corporate
activity, is holding itself out to be engaging in such practice. If, after this review, the Court decides that the corporation is entitled to the constitutional
right, it can then engage in step two—a traditional constitutional analysis of the

837, 856–57 (E.D. Mich. 2016). This recent holding contradicts the majority’s belief that the
holding in Hobby Lobby is narrowly tailored and will not result in a flood of for-profit organizations seeking exemptions. Compare Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783–85, with Garrett,
supra note 5, at 145 (stating that the majority opinion in Hobby Lobby overreaches and conflates the standing of for-profit organizations).
10
Hobby Lobby is based on a combination of an interpretation of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) and the artificial construct of the closely held corporation being distinct enough from a public corporation to command separate constitutional rights. See, e.g.,
Steven J. Willis, Corporations, Taxes, and Religion: The Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Contraception Cases, 65 S.C. L. REV. 1, 32 (2013). On May 4, 2017, President Donald Trump
issued the Presidential Executive Order Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty, which
seeks to protect “the freedom of Americans and their organizations to exercise religion and
participate fully in civic life without undue interference by the Federal Government.” Section 3 of the Order requires, “The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Labor, and the
Secretary of Health and Human Services shall consider issuing amended regulations, consistent with applicable law, to address conscience-based objections to the preventive-care
mandate promulgated under section 300gg-13(a)(4) of title 42, United States Code.” Exec.
Order No. 13798, 82 Fed. Reg. 21675 (May 4, 2017). In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017), the plaintiff pushes it a step further, basing
corporate First Amendment rights on the religious beliefs of a single shareholder and employee. The business seeks to be exempted from a generally applicable state law based on
the religious beliefs of a single person, and makes no argument about the beliefs of the corporation itself. Brief for Petitioners at 1–4, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 137 S. Ct. 2290 (No.
16-111).
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state’s actions.11 Step one of the analysis shows that the corporation is multifaceted: it is both a creature of the state and a stand-alone real entity.
Two-step analysis demonstrates that it is impossible to make sweeping declarations about the nature of corporate constitutional rights. The Constitution is
written for human beings, not entities. To give corporations rights, a fiction
must be created to imprint human characteristics onto the corporation. We can
say legally that the corporation is two things—an artificial entity and a real entity—and those two things require courts to examine and weigh evidence case
by case to decide rights. There are no inalienable corporate rights; therefore, a
rights determination for one corporation is merely persuasive authority for a
determination of rights for another.12
In defining the corporate person, courts must recognize the role of the state
in developing corporate laws and the choices of the corporation’s founders.13
State law determines both the weight of the evidence contemplated in step one,
and which factors courts should consider in step one, because the states have
determined what documents and filings define the corporation. Forming a corporation is a deliberate and purposeful exercise of the founders’ rights, and
should operate as an acceptance of the terms presented by the state—including
any implied limitations on the corporation’s exercise of purely human rights.14
When forming a corporation, what the people choose and what the state provides is an entity that is wholly separate from their individual identity.15 When
11

A two-step analysis of the facts in the Hobby Lobby decision may reach the same conclusion as the Court. To determine whether Hobby Lobby may engage in religious exercise, the
Court would first look to the formation documents to determine whether Hobby Lobby was
created for the purpose of engaging in religious exercise, then to representations of the corporation itself. The Court would not look to the actions of Hobby Lobby’s founders. The
problem with the Court’s approach is that, by allowing Hobby Lobby to obtain rights based
on the people who make up Hobby Lobby, it disregards the intentions of legislatures, states,
and the founders of the corporation. A two-step analysis would clearly deny exercise of religious rights held only by the shareholders in Masterpiece Cakeshop without any evidence of
similar beliefs being held and exercised by the corporation itself.
12
See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 866–67 (2007). Professor Winkler notes that “[C]orporate rights
have never been equivalent to those of individuals.” He also states, “[c]orporate personhood
has played a smaller role in crafting corporate constitutional rights than many believe.” Instead, Professor Winkler explains how shareholder, third party, and capital market interests
are protected when the state infringes on corporate constitutional rights in a way that would
be prohibited for individuals, such as restrictions on commercial speech and SEC prospectus
disclosure requirements. Two-step analysis and the hybrid theory allows for corporations to
have necessary constitutional protections while protecting the rights and financial interests of
those who interact with the corporation.
13
See Pollman, Constitutionalizing, supra note 5, at 644 (discussing corporate law as state
business law).
14
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (2017).
15
Founders not only have a choice in type of entity, but also in type of corporation. Founders who desire a charitable or religious purpose may choose a non-profit 501(c)(3) corporation or a benefit corporation instead of the standard corporation for general business purposes. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 391(j), 501 (2017) (requirements for an exempt
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states recognize these entities, they must balance a desire to promote business
with the interests of the state and rights of third parties who interact with the
artificial business entities.16 In response to this unique and man-made situation,
states weigh protection of unassociated individuals who interact with the corporation with the rights embodied in the corporation’s very existence.17 As illustrated by the transformation from Ruby Partners to Ruby, Inc., when analyzing
the corporate person, courts often ignore the choices of the state and corporate
founders, finding that the rights of the people who make up the corporation
must be protected when the corporation acts.
The corporation is not simply a conglomerate of individuals; therefore, the
Court should carefully scrutinize organizational rights to avoid situations when
corporate actions are taken at the expense of individual rights.18 Because many
corporate rights decisions fail to give weight to actions of states and the goals
of the founders, they often have unpredictable and unsettling results, giving the
appearance of reasoning that is not based in corporate or constitutional law.19
The Court has never explained the source of corporate constitutional rights or
settled on a single theory of the nature of the corporate form.20 Instead, the
Court ignores the deliberate choices of corporate founders, embodied in the distinctions between Ruby Partners and Ruby, Inc., allowing a corporation to avail
itself of constitutional rights in situations when the Court feels a right is so fundamental that it may not be denied in any circumstance.21 This approach ignores the fact that there are no individuals to protect after Ruby is incorporated.
It also ignores that the individuals who incorporate Ruby retain their individual
rights outside of the corporation.
corporation, Delaware’s version of a nonprofit); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 361 (2017) (benefit
corporations).
16
Stefan J. Padfield, Finding State Action When Corporations Govern, 82 TEMP. L. REV.
703, 724 (2009) (arguing corporate theory recognizes that “the State is one of the parties to
the corporate contract with interests beyond merely providing gap-filler rules to effectuate as
nearly as possible the intent of the corporate managers and shareholders.”).
17
See, e.g., Thierry Kirat, The Firm Between Law and Economics, in THE FIRM AS AN
ENTITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMICS, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW 131, 143 (Yuri Biondi
et al. eds., 2007) (When discussing the unique positioning of the corporation, Kirat notes that
the corporation “is not a stable condition of the price system but rather an actor and subject
of the economic dynamic.”); David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1324 (2007).
18
See Chatman, supra note 2, at 88–90 (discussing the dangers of equalizing corporations to
natural persons in contexts not contemplated by the Court).
19
See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 257 ([T]here is no evidence that the First
Amendment’s drafters contemplated spending money in election campaigns as a form of
protected speech. Nor did they intend the First Amendment, or any of the Bill of Rights, to
protect corporations.”); see also sources cited supra note 4.
20
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 257.
21
When analyzing the constitutional rights of human beings, there are certainly rights so
fundamental that they may not be denied in any circumstance. It is my position that because
corporations are creatures of the state given personhood status, limited circumstances or scenarios exist in which the state may deny rights to its creation.
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This Article calls attention to how generations of the Court’s misunderstanding about corporations have resulted in corporate rights decisions that are
a hodgepodge of erroneous claims about the nature of corporations and how
they function.22 Proceeding in four parts, it proposes a new paradigm for analyzing the corporation and its rights that reflects the realities of corporate formation and existence. Part I provides a brief overview of the relevant theories
of the corporation and the role of those theories in Supreme Court decisions.
Part I also explains how theories of corporate personhood are referenced in the
Citizens United decision. In Part II, this Article explores the role people play in
corporations to illustrate the disconnect between the aggregate theory and the
way a corporation operates.
Part III expands the critique of the aggregate theory through a discussion of
how Supreme Court decisions are flawed in their disregard of the realities of
corporate governance realities. Part III also illustrates how the court historically
starts at step two in its analysis of corporate rights—using the facts and possible outcomes to determine whether acknowledging corporate rights is required.
Part IV explains two-step analysis based in the hybrid theory.23 The hybrid theory allows the Court to acknowledge the nature of the corporation and corporate governance, granting rights that correspond with those granted by the state
and the terms negotiated by the incorporators. It incorporates the dual nature of
corporate existence into rights determinations. The Article concludes that the
corporation is a hybrid: a combination of the artificial and real entity theories.24
The corporation is a real, stand-alone entity, independent of the natural persons
who form and operate it. But it is also an artificial entity with rights that are defined and limited by the choices its creators made when adopting the state’s
terms.
I.

PART ONE: AN OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE THEORIES

Corporate personhood is not a new concept. As early as the 1800s, three
distinct theories of the corporation could be found in American jurisprudence.25
Chief Justice John Marshall acknowledged corporate personhood rights under
the artificial entity/concession theory, aggregate theory, and real entity theory.26
Even though corporate personhood is acknowledged so early in our nation’s
history, allowing a corporation to access rights viewed as uniquely human
22

See infra Section III.B.
The hybrid theory acknowledges that the corporation is both a creature of the state (artificial entity/concession theory) and a stand-alone independent entity (real entity theory). See
infra Section IV.B.
24
See infra Part III.
25
See Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge (Dandridge), 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 91–92 (1827)
(real entity theory); Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward (Dartmouth), 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (artificial entity/concession theory); Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux
(Deveaux), 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86–88, 91(1809) (aggregate theory).
26
See discussion infra Section I.A.
23
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shocks the sensibilities, as is shown by the public alarm following the Citizens
United and Hobby Lobby decisions.27 The idea that an entity that does not live
and breathe is entitled to the same rights as a human being is difficult for most
to conceptualize even though it is the natural conclusion of decades of corporate personhood jurisprudence.28 This is particularly true when corporations engage in activities associated only with living breathing persons, like being allowed to influence elections or engaging in religious expression.29
Much of the language on corporate personhood found in Court decisions
fits within one or more of the major theories of corporate personhood first seen
in American jurisprudence in Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinions: the artificial entity/concession theory, aggregate theory, or real entity theory.30 This is
true even when the Court does not acknowledge a theory of the corporation.31The evolution of Chief Justice Marshall’s analysis demonstrates the fact
intensive nature of determining corporate constitutional rights. The Court has
altered how corporations are defined in order to give a corporation rights they
the Court believes they deserve based on changing circumstance. But instead,
the Court should clearly define the corporation, and then use the two-step analysis to grant corporate rights based on the circumstance.
This Part first provides an overview of the theories of corporate personhood to lay the foundation for a discussion of how to adopt or reject them so
they reflect the realities of the corporation’s legal existence. This Part then explains how the theories present themselves in Citizens United.
A. Theories of Corporate Personhood
There is no mention of the corporation in the Constitution, yet the Supreme
Court has held on numerous occasions that the corporation may avail itself of
constitutional rights.32 The concept is first expressed very early by the Supreme
27

See, e.g., Eric L. Lewis, Who Are ‘We the People’?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2014), https://ww
w.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/opinion/sunday/who-are-we-the-people.html [https://perma.cc/Q
X9A-GHYM].
28
See Chatman, supra note 2, at 76–78 (summarizing corporate personhood jurisprudence).
29
For example, in his 2010 State of the Union Address, President Barack Obama objected
not only to the campaign finance changes made by Citizens United, but also to the concept of
corporate personhood generally. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan.
27, 2010), in 156 CONG. REC. H418 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010) (“Last week, the Supreme
Court reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special interests—
including foreign corporations—to spend without limit in our elections.”).
30
There are other theories of the corporation, based in law, economics, and other fields of
study. However, this article focuses only on these three theories.
31
See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L.
REV. 999, 1016 (2010).
32
See Susanna Kim Ripken, Citizens United, Corporate Personhood, and Corporate Power: The Tension Between Constitutional Law and Corporate Law, 6 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 285, 288 (2012) (“[O]ver the last 125 years, the Supreme Court has held corporations are persons entitled to numerous constitutional protections, even though the word
‘corporation’ does not appear anywhere in the Constitution.”).
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Court in a trilogy of decisions authored by Chief Justice John Marshall.33 In the
three cases, Chief Justice Marshall justifies corporate personhood using three
theories.34 In Marshall’s opinion, corporate personhood is either based on concessions made by states and the corporation at the time of formation (artificial
entity theory), the rights of persons who make up the corporation (aggregate
theory), or the autonomy and independence of the corporation following formation (real entity theory).35 The Court has either followed Marshall’s lead
over the years, or has proclaimed the existence of corporate personhood without any justification at all.36 In Citizens United, the Court chose the latter, alluding to three theories of corporate personhood, while proclaiming that it is
not following any one theory.37 Below is a historical analysis of the three theories of corporate personhood discussed in this Article: the artificial entity theory, aggregate theory, and real entity theory.
1. Artificial Entity Theory
The Supreme Court first directly addressed the nature of the corporation in
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.38 Expressing the artificial entity
theory, Marshall states:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as
incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to
effect [sic] the object for which it was created.39

Dartmouth shows that, at least initially, corporations were not persons and
not entitled to all the rights of natural persons.40 This theory views corporate
33

Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (artificial
entity/concession theory); Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86–88,
91(1809); Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 91–92 (1827) (real entity
theory).
34
See, e.g., Gwendolyn Gordon, Culture in Corporate Law or: A Black Corporation, a
Christian Corporation, and a Maori Corporation Walk into a Bar. . ., 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
353, 368 (2016) (“Throughout the last century, courts have switched cheerfully back and
forth, sometimes mid-opinion, in the idea of the corporation on which their analysis rests.”);
Avi-Yonah, supra note 31(The court references all three theories).
35
Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636 (artificial entity/concession theory); Deveaux, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) at 86–88, 91 (aggregate theory); Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 91–92
(real entity theory).
36
See infra Section II.B.
37
See infra Section II.B.
38
Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636.
39
Id.
40
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO.
L.J. 1593 (1988); Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of
Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990); Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of
the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987). See S. Ry. Co.
v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 412–13 (1910); Morton J. Horowitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The
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rights as merely the natural result of what is granted to the corporation during
the chartering process.41 The corporation in Dartmouth is the subordinate of the
government, which can grant the right to exist, take it away, alter it, and regulate it.42 Under the artificial entity theory, the corporation exists at the pleasure
of the state, and the states have the authority to regulate corporations should
they choose to do so.43
While the artificial entity theory does not view corporations as distinctly
separate persons and does not view rights as derivative of its natural persons’
rights, it does acknowledge the existence of corporate rights.44 Even in Dartmouth, the Court notes that corporations can own and sell property, or sue and
be sued.45 Under the artificial entity theory, these rights are merely the result of
what is granted during the chartering process; the corporation does not enter the
state with rights, but the state cannot deny the rights that accompany state sanctioned activities.46 Following Dartmouth, states pushed to the limits of the holding by adding corporate charter provisions permitting states to amend the terms
of the bargain.47 Generally, when courts invoke the artificial entity theory, they
Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 186 (1985) (when courts invoke
concession theory, they are only concerned with protecting the rights granted by the state);
see also Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a “Real” Constitutional Person, 11
U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 221, 225 (2011) (“[C]orporations are subordinate to the government, as
government can create and regulate them.”).
41
Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 667 (Story, J., concurring) (“Among other things, it [a
corporation] possesses the capacity . . . of acting by the collected vote or will of its component members, and of suing and being sued in all things touching its corporate rights and duties.”); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906) (“[T]he corporation is a creature of the state
. . . presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public”). See MARGARET M. BLAIR,
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 207 (1995) (“[F]rom the beginning, . . . corporations [always] required [a] grant or
charter from the state to exist.”); Avi-Yonah, supra note 31; Bratton supra note 5.
42
See Terre Haute & I.R. Co. v. Indiana, 194 U.S. 579, 584 (1904); Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Warren, 181 U.S. 73, 76 (1901) (“A corporation is the creature of the law, and none of
its powers are original. They are precisely what the incorporating act has made them, and
can only be exerted in the manner which that act authorizes.”). See Winkler, supra note 12,
at 863 (“[E]arly decades of the U.S., the states exercised considerable control over corporations. . . .”).
43
Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636; Avi-Yonah, supra note 31, at 1007; Bratton, supra
note 5 (the concession/artificial entity theory comes in degrees: a strong version attributes
the existence of the corporation to state sponsorship; the weaker version sets up state permission as a regulatory prerequisite to doing business).
44
Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636 (artificial entity/concession theory); Bank of the
U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 91–92 (1827) (real entity theory); Bank of the
U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86–88, 91(1809) (aggregate theory).
45
Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636; Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 91–92 (1827);
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 91(1809).
46
See Pollman, Constitutionalizing, supra note 5, at 647 (“Such restrictions were understood
as permissible constraints within the sovereignty of the states, and not infringements of
property or associational rights.”) (citing Head & Armory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 127, 167 (1804) (Marshall, J.)).
47
See Winkler, supra note 12, at 864.

18 NEV. L.J. 811, CHATMAN - FINAL

822

5/15/18 12:28 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:811

are only concerned with protecting the rights granted by the state.48 Thus, the
artificial entity is a theory of acknowledgment, not expansion.
2. Aggregate Theory
Chief Justice Marshall’s view of the corporation also included the aggregate theory, which views the corporation’s rights as indistinguishable from the
rights of the people who make up and own the corporation—shareholders.49
Chief Justice Marshall first proposed the aggregate theory in Bank of United
States v. Deveaux, holding that a corporation cannot sue unless it is viewed as a
company of individuals, represented by a corporate name.50 These individuals
bring rights along with them that flow through them to the corporation.51 Those
rights are not lost by virtue of uniting as a corporation.52 Notably, Deveaux is
used by Chief Justice Marshall in a similar way that aggregate theory supporters use it today—to extend rights to corporations when by statute the state has
indicated that it intends for only human beings to have access to what the statute provides.53
Supporters of the aggregate theory believe that the corporation can do
nothing unless human beings act on its behalf.54 The existence of the corporation is based in the reality of the existence of its humans.55 The aggregate theory was also initially a theory of limitations, binding corporations to only those
things its people were capable of doing. Eventually, the theory evolved into a
theory of expansion, invoking a grant of purely personal human rights to corporations.56

48

See Horowitz, supra note 40, at 186; David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990
DUKE L.J. 201, 212 (1990) (“[T]raditional 19th-century theory insisted that corporations
lacked any powers beyond those conferred by the legislature.”).
49
See, e.g., Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906); Dodge v. Woolsey,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 364 (1855) (Corporation is an artificial entity that cannot sue or be
sued in the courts unless the rights of the members of the corporation can be exercised under
the corporate name) (Campbell, J., dissenting). See Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman,
The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673,
1674 (2015) (courts have granted rights to corporations based on the corporation as an association of citizens since the 1800s). Blair and Pollman argue that the Court’s characterization
as an association of citizens made sense through the nineteenth century, but no longer fit later corporations. Many scholars challenge whether shareholders have property rights in the
corporation and function as its “owners.” See also discussion supra Section II.A.
50
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 86–88, 91.
51
Id.
52
See, e.g., supra note 8 and accompanying text; Garrett, supra note 5, at 98; see supra note
49 and accompanying text.
53
See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Part III.
54
See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 40, at 186.
55
See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW.
1, 9 (2015).
56
See discussion infra Part II.
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3. Real Entity Theory
The third approach views the corporation as a stand-alone entity, separate
and distinct from the state and its shareholders.57 Chief Justice Marshall also
spoke to the real nature of the corporation, highlighting how the corporation
can embody several theories in the mind of a person at once, depending on the
context.58 He first formulated the real entity theory in the dissent of Bank of
United States v. Dandridge.59 Marshall argued that the corporation is “one entire impersonal entity, distinct from the individuals who compose it,” which
will always distinguish its transactions from those of its members.60 Under this
theory, corporations are real persons with real rights; all the state can do is recognize or refuse to recognize a corporation’s existence, but once existence is
recognized the state cannot deny constitutional protections.61 A corporation is
“neither the sum of its owners nor an extension of the state, but [is] a separate
entity controlled by its managers.”62 Corporations hold property in their own
names, enter into contracts that bind only the corporation in their own names,
and engage in other activities indicative of stand-alone natural persons.63 Thus,
under the real entity theory, after formation, the corporation is an entity unto
itself, untethered from its founders, shareholders, and management. The people
associated with the corporation are agents, investors, or lenders; they do not define the corporation.
Corporate governance rules require that the best interest of the corporation,
not the individual shareholders, be the priority of management.64 Under the real
57

See Johnson & Millon, supra note 55, at 8–9 (“[C]orporations own property, enter into
contracts, and commit torts. They can sue and be sued in their own right. They are subject to
penalties if they violate applicable criminal laws. They must comply with a vast array of federal and state regulations. . . . [T]hey are subject to income tax liability on the net income
generated by their commercial activities. . . . [T]he rights and obligations of corporations are
not simply those of their shareholders, officers, directors, employees, or other humans who
participate in or are affected by the corporation’s activities.”); see also Olivier Weinstein,
The Current State of the Economic Theory of the Firm: Contractual, Competence-based, and
Beyond, in THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMICS, ACCOUNTING, AND THE
LAW, supra note 17, at 33 (“The firm exists in its own right, as a specific entity, beyond the
changing personalities of shareholders, workers and managers.”).
58
Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 91–92 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
59
Id.
60
Id.; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 31, at 1007.
61
See Mayer, supra note 40, at 580–81.
62
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 31, at 1001.
63
See, e.g., Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value Systems Theory
for Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579, at 590–91 (2018) (“One of the hallmarks of the
corporate form is that corporations are legal persons with rights, including the right to hold
property in their own names. This means that, just as a natural person cannot be owned by
another, a corporation cannot be owned by its shareholders. What shareholders do own are
shares.”).
64
Marc T. Moore & Antoine Rebérioux, The Corporate Governance of the Firm as an Entity: Old Issues for the New Debate, in THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR
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entity theory, the courts recognize the true nature of corporate property and the
relationship of the corporation with its shareholders and managers.65 Courts
acknowledge that independence from individuals is required for limited liability, perpetual life, and other elements essential to the corporate form.66 Under
this theory, the corporation is a separate entity controlled by management that
is embodied with its own rights and must comply with the law like any other
person.67
The theories of corporate personhood are useful for expressing the relationship of the corporation to society in each context, but no single theory adequately addresses every scenario. For this reason, Justices like Marshall alternate between the theories of the corporation when analyzing rights, applying
whichever theory supports the desired outcome.68 Over time the Court has
switched among theories, sometimes within the same opinion, and eventually
began expanding rights without relying on any theory of corporate personhood.69 The Court tends to rely on the aggregate and real entity theories when
granting rights and the artificial entity theory when restricting corporate
rights.70 Instead of being influenced by the realities of corporate structure and
governance, the Court focuses on constitutional theory, taking a right-by-right,
and in some circumstances, a case-by-case, approach.71 This approach is problematic when the Court disregards the intentions of corporate founders, states,
and legislatures and grants rights to the corporation regardless.
Many aspects of the corporation, including limited liability, may be negotiated by contract.72 Thus, when founders choose the corporation, they are affirmatively choosing not to order their business dealings using private contracting.73 When states define business entities, they do so with the intention of
defining rules for formation and conditions for continued recognition.74 The
ECONOMICS, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW, supra note 17, at 370 (“The corporate governance
of the firm . . . must be based at root upon the managerialist conception of the interest of the
company characteristic of most U.S. state corporate law systems. . . .”).
65
See Weinstein, supra note 57.
66
See Johnson & Millon, supra note 55, at 8.
67
See also Weinstein, supra note 57 (“The firm exists in its own right, as a specific entity,
beyond the changing personalities of shareholders, workers and managers”).
68
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 31, at 1032 (“As the relationship of the corporation to the
state, to society and to its members or shareholders changes, all three views of the corporation emerge, submerge and then re-emerge in slightly different but fundamentally similar
forms.”).
69
See Gordon, supra note 34, at 368 (“Throughout the last century, courts have switched
cheerfully back and forth, sometimes mid-opinion, in the idea of the corporation on which
their analysis rests.”).
70
See Chatman, supra note 2.
71
See Garrett, supra note 5, at 100.
72
See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
22 (1995).
73
See Millon, supra note 17, at 1307.
74
See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 22.
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current approach infringes upon the rights of the states to define business entities, and the freedom of individuals to contract for the entity with the parameters they desire. Alternatively, the Court should examine the theories and adopt
a position representative of the true corporate nature.75 The hybrid theory combines the artificial entity and real entity theories to provide a legal approach to
corporate rights that accurately reflects the true nature of corporations.76 Combining the hybrid theory with the two-step analysis properly acknowledges the
corporate form and results in the appropriate level of constitutional protection.
B. The Corporate Form in Citizens United
Early on, the Court ignored the use of the word “persons” in the Constitution, declaring without justification that the word included corporations.77 Although corporations are not mentioned in the Constitution, as noted by both
Justices Stevens and Scalia in the Citizens United opinion, the Court considered
the nature of the corporation rather early.78 Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Citizens United conveys a belief that the founding fathers’ silence on corporations
within the text of the Constitution indicates an intention to include corporations
in the rights given to persons.79 Justice Stevens’ dissent contradicts these statements by profiling the history of corporations to show that the omission is in-

75

See discussion infra Part IV. Many scholars credit this approach for the current discontent
with Citizens United, and fault the approach for opening the door for an expansion of corporate rights beyond what the state and the Constitution’s drafters intended. See, e.g., Vincent
S.J. Buccola, Corporate Rights and Organizational Neutrality, 101 IOWA L. REV. 499, 501
(2016) (summarizing the corporate personhood debate reignited by Citizens United).
76
See discussion infra Section IV.B.
77
See generally Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); see also David Ciepley,
Neither Persons nor Associations: Against Constitutional Rights for Corporations, 1 J.L. &
CTS. 222, 222 (2013) (drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to include corporations as person granted due process); Winkler, supra note 12, at 865 (“When the court
reporter included this statement at the beginning of the published opinion, corporate personhood was established—without argument, without justification, without explanation, and
without dissent.”); Ripken, supra note 32, at 288.
78
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 338–41, 371 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring); see
also Mayer, supra note 40, at 579 n.8 (citing Gerard Carl Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law, in 2 HARVARD STUDIES IN
JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1918)); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780–1970 (1970).
79
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 338–41 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia’s concurrence states, “It never shows why ‘the freedom of speech’ that was the right of Englishmen
did not include the freedom to speak in association with other individuals, including association in the corporate form. . . . [T]he dissent feels no necessity to provide even an isolated
statement from the founding era to the effect that corporations are not covered.” The Court
disregarded the distinction between corporations, natural persons, and citizens; instead, the
Citizens United majority proclaimed that states must look to the underlying nature of the
right, not to the party exercising the right. Scalia also accepts as reality the interpretation of
the corporation as an association of citizens without regard to corporate realities. See also
Ciepley, supra note 77, at 222.
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dicative of an original intent to deny corporations constitutional rights.80 Justice
Stevens recounts all the ways a corporation is not a natural person: corporations
enjoy limited shareholder liability, perpetual life; separation of ownership of
property and its control; corporations also have no consciences, no beliefs, no
feelings, no thoughts or desires.81 While the earliest cases agree with Stevens’
retelling of corporate nature, and there is no support for Scalia’s blanket assertions about the original intent of the founders, the reality of the corporate form
lies somewhere in between.82
Because the language of the Constitution is focused on persons and citizens, in order to extend rights to corporations the Court must define them as
such through the legal fiction of corporate personhood.83 To make this logical
leap the Court analogizes corporate scenarios to human scenarios, even when
doing so contradicts the very nature of corporate law. At the oral re-argument
for the Citizens United case, Justice Sotomayor questioned whether the leap
was ever justified:
[W]hat you are suggesting is that the courts who created corporations as persons,
gave birth to corporations as persons, and there could be an argument made that
that was the Court’s error to start with . . . the fact that the Court imbued a creature of State law with human characteristics.84

Sotomayor’s questioning rightfully highlights the lack of support for corporate rights in the Constitution.85 It falls in line with the artificial entity theory.
80

See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens’s dissent
states: “[T]here is not a scintilla of evidence to support the notion that anyone believed [it]
would preclude regulatory distinctions based on the corporate form.”
81
See id. at 371; see discussion infra Part III.
82
See discussion supra note 40 and accompanying text.
83
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 253 (“[T]he Court’s premise that corporations should
have the same speech rights as individuals is just wrong. . . . There is no evidence that the
framers of the First Amendment meant to protect corporations or campaign spending, let
alone bestow a right for corporations to spend unlimited sums in election campaigns. The
Supreme Court has explained that the First Amendment protects speech especially because
of its importance to the autonomy and dignity of each person, something that has no meaning
when it comes to corporations.”); see also Tucker, supra note 3, at 511.
84
Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Citizens United, 588 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205).
85
For a discussion of the lack of constitutional support for corporate rights, see, for example, Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed
Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 62 (2005) (“[T]he Court
has never established a test to determine what a constitutional person is or whether a corporation meets such a test . . . The result is a foundational problem in corporate constitutional
law, for the Court has granted corporations constitutional rights without engaging in the preliminary inquiry of whether a corporation is entitled to them under the Constitution.”);
Ciepley, supra note 77, at 224 (“[T]he question has never been decided but merely presumed
decided. To this day, in place of argumentation, the Court either offers a flawed chain of
precedent back to Santa Clara, which never addressed the question, or drops loose metaphors of corporations being ‘persons’ or ‘associations of persons,’ which conjure[s] up theories elaborated by others.”); Winkler, supra note 12, at 865. See also Tucker, supra note 3, at
499 (discussing the five realities of corporate political speech ignored by the Court in Citizens United).
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Although correct, Justice Sotomayor’s questioning also highlights a common
fallacy in corporate personhood analysis—the commitment to the corporation
existing solely in one theory of corporate personhood.86 The “creature of State
law with human characteristics” derives those characteristics in part from how
it operates in the world after the state creates it—a principle of the real entity
theory. Corporate personhood analysis cannot end at formation. To fully analyze corporate rights, the courts must properly acknowledge what the corporation is after it is formed.
The majority in Citizens United holds that corporations have the same First
Amendment rights as natural persons; therefore, restrictions on corporate
spending in election campaigns are unconstitutional.87 In reaching this conclusion, the majority explicitly stated that it did not adhere to any one theory of
corporate personhood.88 This puts Citizens United on trend with other cases that
personify the corporation without acknowledging a theory of corporate personhood.89 Professor Carl Mayer explains that for nearly sixty years the Court has
avoided declaring explicitly that it subscribes to a particular corporate personhood theory.90 Instead, the Court looks at the right itself and the purpose of the
right, essentially starting at step two and presuming that the organization is entitled to the right.91 This is precisely how the majority of Citizens United arrived at its holding.
As with most corporate personhood opinions, in Citizens United one can
see theories of corporate personhood within the decision, even when the Court
does not acknowledge them.92 In holding that a corporation is entitled to free86

See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 45 (noting that the flaw in the Court’s approach
to corporate personhood is viewing the corporation through the lens of only its obligations to
the shareholder, instead of viewing the corporation as a whole system of many component
parts).
87
Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 385. Professor Chemerinsky disagrees with the premise that
spending money is speech. He believes spending money is conduct, and references Justice
Steven’s explanation that money is a property right subject to lesser protections than speech.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 253.
88
Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 310.
89
Mayer, supra note 40, at 620 (“Before 1960, the Court only considered corporations’ constitutional guarantees within the strictures of corporate personhood theory: a corporation was
either an ‘artificial’ entity subject to expansive state regulation or a ‘natural’ entity entitled to
constitutional protections against the state. After 1960, the Court abandoned theorizing about
corporate personhood.”).
90
Id.
91
See discussion infra Part IV (outlining the differences between human beings and artificial persons, and fully explaining step one analysis); see also Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 84; Ciepley, supra note 77, at 223 (explaining that the Court never offered a sustainable argument as to why corporations have constitutional rights); Krannich, supra note
85, at 62; Mayer, supra note 40, at 629 (“Frequently the Court looked to the history of the
amendment in question to justify corporate rights [and] . . . occasionally the Court examined
the underlying purposes of an amendment.”).
92
Professor Padfield’s work has extensively profiled the impact of silent corporate personhood in Supreme Court decisions. See Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Cases, 15 J. CONST. L. 831, 834 (2013) [here-
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speech rights equal to those held by an individual because it is capable of
speaking, the majority hinted at the aggregate and real entity theories.93 The
Court equated corporations to natural persons, declaring that since the corporation is capable of speaking, either through money or through persons in the aggregate, it is entitled to constitutional free-speech rights.94 Instead of taking
constitutional silence as an indication of the non-existence of corporate rights,
the Court decides that silence indicated intent to grant corporations rights based
on the rights of its shareholders.
In Citizens United, the majority struck down a campaign finance regulation
on the premise that corporations should receive the same First Amendment protections as natural persons, holding that distinctions based on who is asserting a
right are improper.95 In support of this holding, the Court cited First Amendment cases and stated that it “rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First
Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’ ”96 This
not only ignores the distinction between entities and persons, but also the statutory differences between the various business entities. The Court held that
Congress had “no basis . . . [to] impose restrictions on certain disfavored
speakers.”97 The majority also held that there was no support for the view that
the Amendment’s original meaning would permit suppressing a media corporation’s political speech.98 Citizens United expanded corporate rights, holding
that the distinctions between corporate persons and citizens are not proper; instead, corporations should not be restricted any more than a wealthy individual.99

inafter Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory] (examining the cases leading up to
Citizens United, finding that a silent corporate theory debate is evident); Stefan J. Padfield,
Citizens United and the Nexus-of-Contracts Presumption, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 25
(2011), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Padfield_Online_Article.pdf [https
://perma.cc/G39D-KSF2] (arguing that in Citizens United, “adoption of . . . competing theories of the firm was in some meaningful way dispositive”).
93
See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text.
94
Gordon, supra note 34, at 370 (“Citizens United . . . indicate[s] that corporations simply
were speakers, indistinguishable from any other speakers, for the purposes of First Amendment speech rights. . . . The bright-line approach favored by the current Court is a new development.”).
95
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349–57 (2010).
96
Id. at 343, (citing First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
97
Id. at 341.
98
Id. at 353; Joan MacLeod Heminway, Thoughts on the Corporation as a Person for Purposes of Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 STETSON L. REV. 137, 138 (2011) (“In Citizens
United, the Court determined that political-speech protections under the First Amendment
apply to corporations as well as individuals, and it found no basis to allow the government to
impose political-speech limits ‘on certain disfavored speakers.’ ”).
99
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 355–56. The court is also implying that distinctions between
partnerships, limited liability companies (LLCs), and corporations are not appropriate for
consideration when determining rights.
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Justice Steven’s dissent in Citizens United invokes the artificial entity theory.100 He envisions corporations as state approved entities, which exist at the
pleasure of the government, are non-corporeal, and may be subject to more extensive regulation than a natural person due to this privileged position.101 Scalia’s concurrence criticizes Justice Steven’s dissent because “[i]t never shows
why ‘the freedom of speech’ that was the right of Englishmen did not include
the freedom to speak in association with other individuals, including association in the corporate form.”102 According to Scalia and the majority, because
the corporation is an association of individuals, the individuals do not lose their
constitutional rights when they assemble.103 Denying a corporation the opportunity to voice its opinion on elections is the equivalent of denying the free
speech rights of the citizens who make up a corporation.104 This standard does
not change, even if the corporation itself is merely a person and not a citizen
with the ability to actually vote in an election.105
Justice Scalia’s position ignores the distinctions between business entities
and the purpose of choosing to form a corporation. It also ignores the fact that
the individuals who form the corporation can still voice their opinions individually. While a corporation may rightly be viewed as an association of individuals, it is an association of individuals who affirmatively choose the corporation.
It is a business structure divorced from their person for purposes of profits, liability, and management instead of the partnership, which maintains the identity
of the individuals and operates more like the pure association of citizens indicated by the aggregate theory.106 By availing themselves of the benefits of the
corporate choice, these individuals are affirmatively choosing to give up individuality to create a new and separate corporate person.107
The majority’s position in Citizens United is not new, it is merely the first
time the Court explicitly declared that corporate constitutional rights should be
equal to individuals. This leap is aided by the Court’s express abandonment of
a theory of corporate personhood. The Court, acting without a clear definition
of the corporation and constitutional restrictions of its own choosing, could expand rights by merely choosing a new standard and accepting it as law.108 The
Court’s failure to articulate a clear corporate personhood theory or a consistent
means of analyzing corporate rights presents both a challenge and an oppor100

Id. at 393 (Stevens J., dissenting).
Id. at 385–86, 391–92 (Scalia, J., concurring).
102
Id. at 386.
103
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 31, at 1041; Ciepley, supra note 77, at 224.
104
See Ciepley, supra note 77, at 234–35.
105
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 424–31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106
BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 4 (“[N]o one is forced to use the corporate form of
organization: there is freedom of choice in organizational form. . . . This fundamental choice
constrains the ability of corporate managers to misbehave.”).
107
See infra notes 112–19 and accompanying text.
108
See, e.g., Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen Wells, The Supreme Court as Prometheus:
Breathing Life into the Corporate Supercitizen, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 507, 550–51 (2012).
101
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tunity for those who view Citizens United as an overreach. Cases like Citizens
United accept corporate rights and personhood status as a foregone conclusion,
making it difficult to determine at any given moment what rights a corporation
has and what limitations are imposed on those rights.109
In Citizens United, the Court also disregards the role of the people it seeks
to protect in corporate governance: the shareholders. The aggregate theory,
which views corporations as an association of citizens, does not reflect the reality of corporate operations. Instead, courts should engage in a two-step analysis
of representations of corporate personhood that both acknowledges the state’s
definition of a corporation and how the corporation defines itself. The next Part
provides an analysis of the role people play in the corporation.
II. PART TWO: THE CORPORATION HAS NO PEOPLE
Legally, shareholders act in a limited number of ways: through voting, resolution, exercise of inspection rights, litigation, or selling their shares.110 The
shareholders are mere financial investors, and entrust all of the decisions to the
board of directors and officers of the corporation.111 The shareholders purchase
shares, receive equity, and give up control of the company in exchange for a
complete shield from personal liability.112 The actions shareholders may take
can be limited in corporate charters, bylaws, or other contractual agreements.113
109

See Ciepley, supra note 77, at 222–23 (Professor Ciepley believes the rights of a corporation are purely contractual, corporations have no constitutional rights); see also Amicus Curiae Brief of Corp. & Criminal Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note 4, at 3–4
(discussing how application of RFRA to corporations frustrates corporate law). While I believe that corporations do have constitutional rights for reasons that are based in more than
contract, I disagree with the Court’s use of a case that should be founded in corporate law,
like Citizens United or Hobby Lobby, to make a general point about freedom of speech or
freedom of religion. The Court’s analysis of those rights in both cases would be correct if it
was applied to human beings.
110
See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
204–06, 208 (2012); see also BLAIR, supra note 41, at 69 (“[T]he number of matters that
must be submitted to shareholder vote is limited. . . . [T]hese include substantive amendments to the articles of incorporation and fundamental changes that are not part of the ordinary business of the company, such as merger, dissolution, or disposition of a substantial
part of corporate assets.”).
111
See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (business and affairs of
the corporation managed under the direction of the board). Some argue that shareholders are
not owners, but mere holders of equity in the corporation. Professors Blair and Stout’s theory
of asset lock-in notes that the shareholder’s contribution cannot be unilaterally withdrawn
from the corporation by shareholders, just as it cannot be withdrawn by the corporation’s
creditors. The corporation’s assets belong to the corporation and not its investors, meaning
even a shareholder’s equity rights are limited. Instead of having a right to dissolve a company if necessary to retain the full value of the capital contribution, such as in a partnership,
shareholders’ ability to withdraw assets from a corporation is limited by the market and director approval. See Blair & Stout, supra note 6, at 278.
112
Shareholder contributions to the new stand-alone corporate entity creates a level of stability not found in other business entities. This stability in return limits the rights of shareholders in many respects. When shareholders make their investment in a corporation, they
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Although much of corporate governance has been based on the concept of
shareholder primacy, many have noted that the interests of shareholders are not
the driving force in corporate decisions.114 This Part first describes the true nature of shareholder rights, then explains the role of corporate directors and officers.
A. The True Nature of Shareholder Rights
As early as 1963, Adolf Berle noted the shift from ownership control of
corporations, more common in closely held corporations, to management control.115 As the purchase of stock became a secondary market, with major influence from institutional investors such as pension funds, mutual funds, and other
financial institutions, the thoughts and desires of individual human investors
had a reduced impact.116 Berle also noted that this management group is responsible to the company first, and the individual whims of shareholders second.117 The structure of corporations does not allow shareholders to be in-

may only get their money back if there is a buyer willing to pay a price equal to the full value of the shareholder’s investment, the corporation itself buys back the shares, or a court determines the corporation must compensate the shareholder. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 255 (2005).
113
See LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER ON SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISM 12 (2011) (“Although the shareholder voting right has been described as fundamental, it is relatively limited. . . . State corporate law provides that the board exercises most
of the power and control within the corporation.”).
114
See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 14 (noting the criticism of shareholder primacy).
115
Adolf A. Berle Jr., The Impact of the Corporation on Classical Economic Theory, in THE
FIRM AS AN ENTITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMICS, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW, supra note
17, at 96 (stockholders derive what influence they have from socio-political, not from entrepreneurial, factors).
116
Id. at 94. Berle notes the sentimental rather than capital raising nature of the secondary
stock market. The corporation does not need the stockholder’s money, as the stock on the
exchange is being purchased from a current owner, not the corporation itself. As a result,
“the classical justification for him as a source of capital, or as investment risk-taker, let alone
as entrepreneur-manager, simply disappears.” Id. at 102; see BLAIR, supra note 41, at 68–69
(shareholders may exit by selling shares, or communicate directly to management, but in
practice gives shareholders little power); Stout, supra note 112 (Shareholders are investors
with a right to sell shares, but no right to compel a cash out from the corporation. It is the
secondary market that makes shares freely alienable; otherwise a purchase of shares locks in
capital to the corporation like a “tar pit” that is easier to get into than to get out of. There is
no recourse if shares are worth less than the shareholder put into the corporation).
117
Berle, supra note 115 at 96. In the Amicus Brief of Corporate Law Professors in Support
of Respondents in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct.
2290 (2017), it is noted that the varying opinions among legal scholars on shareholder primacy does not undermine a unanimous view on corporate separateness. “Shareholder primacy is simply a description of one view of the fiduciary duties of management. It does not
mean that shareholders and the corporation are identical as a matter of legal rights and obligations.” Brief of Amici Curiae Corp. Law Professors in Support of Respondents, at 15 n.7,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 137 S. Ct. 2290 (No. 16-111).
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volved in the day-to-day decision making of corporations, and even if it did, the
shareholders are disincentivized to do so.118
The requirement for a majority vote further limits the influence of an individual shareholder.119 Shareholder votes are often counted in ways that allow
for limits on minority influence, like super majority or non-cumulative voting.120 Anyone with the funds can become a shareholder, but it takes considerable wealth or collective power for shareholders to have the power to make
changes.121 Shareholders who own the majority of shares are typically comprised of an elite class of individuals—institutions such as mutual funds buying
on behalf of investors collectively, the initial founders of the company, and
other power investors.122 For this reason, shares are only controlled by “people”
if all types of institutions—including hedge funds, banks, mutual funds—are
equal to people.123 Thus, even if a corporation is viewed as a representative, aggregate body, the entities they represent are not natural persons.124 Like nesting
dolls, institutions that may not have rights unless the aggregate theory is utilized, are being extended additional rights through their interests in a corporation.125 Any individual purchasing shares on the open market has little to no
ability to impact corporate operations or to have their opinion represented, at
least not at the level of an investment bank or wealthy investor.
Corporations are not the only entity with limited liability, so when a corporation is formed, it is an affirmative decision to choose all the positives and
negatives of the corporate form, including giving up control. LPs, LLPs, and
LLCs126 can come close to simulating many of the benefits of corporations
118

Berle, supra note 115.
Another restriction is the requirement for a unanimous vote for shareholder action without a meeting. See FAIRFAX, supra note 113, at 19.
120
Id. at 15–16.
121
Id.
122
See BLAIR, supra note 41, at 72–76 (discussing the rise of institutional investors, and the
myth of corporate democracy as a result of shareholder activism); FAIRFAX, supra note 113,
at 45–61; see also Berle, supra note 115 (noting rise of institutional investors).
123
See BLAIR, supra note 41, at 147–48 (Financial institutions hold more than forty percent
of the total financial claims against U.S. individuals, corporations and governments; more
than eighty percent of corporate bonds, and almost half of corporate equity claims. Even so,
institutions have their own agenda, which may not involve getting involved in management
or closely monitoring).
124
If the owners of shares are also artificial entity, acknowledging the rights of the people
who make up the firm creates a scenario of nesting dolls in which courts are protecting the
rights of the people who make up the company that makes up the company. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 3, at 528 (noting the agency problems with granting rights based on the people
who make up the corporation).
125
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 110; BLAIR, supra note 41, at 147–48; FAIRFAX, supra note
113, at 45–61.
126
I do not discuss the LLC extensively because I believe it can, depending on the structure
chosen by founders, operate like a partnership or a corporation. For this reason, I believe the
LLC to best be described as a hybrid of the artificial entity theory and the nexus of contracts
theory. The LLC does not exist without the state, but once formed whether it should be treat119
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while allowing owners to maintain a higher level of control, and continuing the
operation of the company as an aggregate of the people who make up the company.127 Therefore, when corporate founders choose the corporation, they have
the full menu of business entities at their disposal, and make the affirmative
choice to incorporate.128
Despite these statutory realities, the Court, in Citizens United and other decisions, would have us believe that corporations represent the opinions of the
founders and managers the same as partnerships or sole proprietorships.129 By
statute and by contract, corporate structure differs from what the courts portray.
The reality of the corporation is that management is divorced from ownership
so it operates more like a monarchy (or oligarchy) than a democracy.130 The
ed like an association of citizens or a real entity will be determined by contract. Nexus of
contracts envisions the corporation as a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a mass of bilateral contracts, which various individuals have voluntarily entered into for their mutual
benefit. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 1259, 1273 (1982). As Professor Joseph Morrissey explains, “[w]hile the state entity
proponents argue that whatever the state creates it can regulate, the contractarians argue that
the state’s role should be limited to enforcing and policing the privately structured contracts
that create and sustain the corporation.” Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Critique of
Citizens United, 15 J. CONST. L. 765, 812 (2013). Many scholars disagree with this theory,
stating that viewing the corporation as a nexus of contract or as assets/property does not adequately represent the true nature of the corporation. See, e.g., David Gindis, Some Building
Blocks for a Theory of the Firm as a Real Entity, in THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY: IMPLICATIONS
FOR ECONOMICS, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW, supra note 17, at 277 (“Firms are not simply
sets of contracts or collections of assets. . . . Firms are not aggregates or ‘mereologicial
sums.’ The very issue of comparing the whole to the sum of its parts is problematic. . . .
[T]he whole is reducible neither to its members (e.g. owners) nor its parts (e.g. assets)”);
Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 10 (“[T]he nexus of contracts theory can be critiqued
for failing to acknowledge the corporation’s legal personhood, and also failing to emphasize
the crucial role played by the state in creating the corporation.”); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of “Nexus of Contracts” Theory, 109
MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (2011) (because individuals must apply to a state for permission
to form a corporation, the corporation cannot be formed by contract).
127
See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 4–5 (individuals choose among types of organizations by comparing costs and benefits of forms, including the costs and benefits of
delegating control to agents).
128
See, e.g., Agai v. Diontech Consulting, Inc., No. 102968/07, 2013 WL 4419323, at *1–2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 19, 2013) (Factors to be considered by a court in determining whether to
pierce the corporate veil include failure to adhere to corporate formalities, inadequate capitalization, commingling of assets, and use of corporate funds for personal use).
129
Id.; See also Pollman, Constitutionalizing, supra note 5, at 665 (“The Court’s decisions
expanding speech and religious liberty rights of business corporations rely, at least in part,
on a view of corporations as associations and corporate law as establishing procedures of
‘democracy’ for shareholders. But not all business corporations have an associational dynamic and existing corporate laws do not create democratic procedures, nor is that their
aim.”).
130
See BLAIR, supra note 41, at 69 (“In principle, the law is intended to give shareholders a
significant amount of control. In practice, it does not always work out that way. Technically,
shareholders must regularly elect or reelect the board of directors, but shareholders cannot
easily remove a director whose term has not expired, and shareholders do not, typically, participate in the nomination process for new directors.”); see Berle, supra note 115 (stockhold-
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aggregate theory presumes the corporation is an expression of the business decisions of the people who make up the corporation in the same way that a partnership represents the business decisions of the partners.131 When adopting the
principles of the aggregate theory, the Court assumes that shareholders have a
voice that is expressed in corporate actions.132 The separation of management
and ownership means that corporate governance is not about the voice of
shareholders in the way that a partnership is the voice of the partners. Instead,
directors and officers are the voices that speak for the corporation.133
The statutory requirements and nature of corporate governance are not the
only things that limit the volume of the shareholder’s voice.134 The traditional
assumption is that shareholders are not incentivized economically to be active
in corporate operations.135 The expense of investigation, advancing shareholder
initiatives, and of shareholder derivative suits all create rational ignorance in
the average shareholder.136 There is no benefit gained from spending money in
order to get familiar enough with corporate operations to pursue measures that
may be greater than the value of an individual’s financial investment. 137 Instead, it is more rational for the average shareholder to be a passive investor
and rely on the recommendations of the board.138 This is true even for many
shareholders who control a majority of shares, as those investors often hold a

ers derive what influence they have from socio-political, not from entrepreneurial, factors);
see also, e.g., Statement on Company Law: Summary: Fundamental Rules of Corporate Law,
THE MODERN CORP. (Sept. 14, 2014), https://themoderncorporation.wordpress.com/company
-law-memo/ [https://perma.cc/LES9-ZM77] (“Certain beliefs about corporations and corporate law are widely held and relied upon by business experts, the financial press, and economists who study the firm. Unfortunately, some of these widely-held beliefs are mistaken.”).
131
In a closely held corporation, the people who make up the corporation are responsible for
corporate decisions, but not in their role as shareholder. For a discussion of closely held corporations, see infra notes 205–11 and accompanying text.
132
See, e.g., Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 13 (noting that the shareholder contract
gives shareholders limited rights with almost no real influence in the context of a public corporation with dispersed share ownership).
133
See, e.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, Corporate Legacy, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 237, 245–49,
254 (2015) (noting the rate at which IPOs include anti-takeover defenses, despite market
forces that show including them. Schwartz theorizes that the desire for corporate legacy and
perpetual life is a stronger force than shareholder desires and market forces). See also BLAIR,
supra note 41, at 77 (governance and control of corporations occurs through customs, cultural norms, and institutional arrangements); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as
Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 25 (2002) (“Put simply, the board is the nexus.”);
Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 41 (proposing that shareholder value is an illusory metric for measuring director behavior, and that systems theory is an appropriate tool for assessing performance).
134
BLAIR, supra note 41, at 79; see Schwartz, supra note 133, at 254.
135
See FAIRFAX, supra note 113, at 5; see also BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 7–8
(shareholders are rationally ignorant, but protected by the right to vote and sell shares).
136
BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 8.
137
Id.
138
Id.
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large number of shares in numerous corporations.139 For this reason, much
shareholder activism begins at the initiative of disgruntled board members or is
a result of merger and acquisition activity.140
The Court’s perception of corporate ownership should be influenced by the
realities of ownership and formation.141 Unfortunately, the Court bases its opinion on erroneous assumptions when it rules that corporations have speech and
religion rights based on the aggregate of the people who “make up the corporation.”142 Those who make up the corporation, under the Court’s definition, are
not those whose rights are represented by corporate actions. Those who “make
up” the corporation are mostly silent investors.143 The role of corporate shareholders is especially insignificant when compared to the actions of the investors
of a partnership, who may also be engaged in management of the partnership.
By apprising themselves of limited liability, shareholders agree to trust others
to represent their purely financial interests and serve the corporate purpose indicated at the time of incorporation.144
B. Directors and Officers: The Corporation’s People?
Corporations act through shareholders as well as directors and officers authorized by state law to carry out corporate business.145 The religious or political interests of each individual shareholder, or shareholders in the aggregate, do
139

Butler and Ribstein note that when some owners of large blocks of shares have so much
wealth tied up in a firm, they cannot afford to be ignorant about governance. This changes
the role of the shareholder and the information level, but not the general operation of the
corporation or its structure. Id. at 9.
140
See, e.g., Hoepner v. Wachovia Corp., No. 01CVS005106, 2001 WL 34000145, at *1
(N.C. Sup. Ct. 2001).
141
Gordon, supra note 34, at 372 (“Given the ‘personal’ nature of these rights, the Contingent Corporation’s ability to ‘have’ some particular cultural, racial, or political characteristic
depends, to a not-insignificant extent, upon perceptions of the nature of ownership.”).
142
See discussion supra notes 82–89.
143
BLAIR, supra note 41, at 147–48, 169 (discussing market share and power of institutional
investors and tendency to serve their own interests). Those investing outside of an institution, or beyond a corporation’s founders or management group, do not hold a majority or
even a plurality sufficient to exercise control of the corporation through the limited ways
shareholders may act. See also supra notes 121–23 (discussing shareholder power).
144
See, e.g., Stout, supra note 112, at 257–58 (noting that the corporate form minimizes
risks from whims of other investors through capital lock-in. The corporation protects shareholders from each other for the good of the corporation in a way that is not present in a partnership). The process of protecting shareholders from each other for the good of the corporation inherently means the corporation is a separate entity. Directors are not just focused on
what is good for the majority, but what allows the corporation to continue. See, e.g., Andrew
A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764, 768–69 (2012) (Theorizing that because corporation is perpetual by statute, corporation obligated to act with
long term view on behalf of future not just current shareholders).
145
Schwartz, supra note 144, at 767. Directors owe fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to
the corporation and shareholders. See Pollman, Constitutionalizing, supra note 5, at 651
(providing an overview of the history of fiduciary duties).
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not motivate the actions of the directors and officers of the corporation. Instead,
the directors and officers are motivated to advance the goals of the corporation,
and to act in the best interest of the corporation, without knowledge or regard to
the personal opinions of shareholders.146 The directors and officers are not required to seek out and adhere to the moral, legal, or business whims of the majority of the shareholders.
By design, shareholders have very little influence over the management of
a corporation.147 This is confirmed by the fact that despite the recent financial
industry scandals and greater public scrutiny of corporate behavior, there have
been mostly unsuccessful attempts at increasing shareholder influence.148
Shareholders have not been aware of most of the wrongful actions of corporate
directors and officers.149 If they had been aware, there is little that a single
shareholder can do outside of selling shares.150 Even corporate actions are further limited by corporate statutes and bylaws, which allow for boards to circumvent shareholder proposals.151 Additionally, the procedural requirements to
advance a claim in court against the directors require a heightened pleading
standard, making litigation a costly option that is typically not worthwhile.152
When shareholders push for a voice in the corporation, it rarely results in corporate change.153
In fact, to bend to the will of shareholders and take actions that are not in
the best interest of the corporation may subject directors and officers to liability
for breach of fiduciary duties.154 By force of statute and common law, boards
and corporate officers are tasked with looking out for the best interest of the
corporation.155 The corporate law provided by the state requires directors and
officers to make sound business decisions, to avoid engaging in wasteful activity, and to remain diligent in the administration of corporate duties.156 Although
146

See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 110, at 204–06, 208.
See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 13.
148
See, e.g., BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 10 (discussing rational ignorance);
FAIRFAX, supra note 113, at 35 (discussing the Wall Street Rule); Belinfanti & Stout, supra
note 63, at 17 n.76 (noting that many recent scandals may have been caused by an unhealthy
management focus on immediate results instead of operation of the corporation for the longterm).
149
See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 17 n.76.
150
See sources cited supra note 116 (discussing the limited ways shareholders may act).
151
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 222(a) (2009); see also Goggin v. Vermillion, Inc., No.
6465-VCN, 2011 WL 2347704, at *4 (Del. Ch. 2011).
152
See DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (discussing requirements for a shareholder derivative lawsuit).
153
See FAIRFAX, supra note 113; see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 110, at 242–43 (little evidence that shareholder activism mattered; investor activism remains rare).
154
See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30–.31.
155
See Schwartz, supra note 144, at 809; see also Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 607
(The shareholder is only one, and not necessarily the most important, of the many different
groups that should be considered when managing a corporation).
156
Schwartz, supra note 144, at 809.
147
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the directors and officers are agents and fiduciaries of the corporation and
shareholders, once authorized, the decisions of directors and officers need not
comply with shareholder interests day-to-day.
Directors are beholden to protecting the corporation and all shareholders—
both current and future.157 In looking out for this best interest, corporations
must give deference to the law and make business decisions based on the market, but not to the desires of the shareholders.158 If complying with laws of general application is contrary to the wishes of shareholders, the legal duties supersede the shareholder whims.159 Should the directors choose to ignore experts
and the realities of the market and instead cede to shareholder control, they
could face liability if the corporation or shareholders themselves suffer a
loss.160
With these realities in mind, many of the Court’s concerns regarding rights
particular to human beings are misplaced. If a right is one which a corporation
personally cannot enjoy, extending the right to the corporation as a proxy for
“the people” is improper. If the fiduciary interests and the corporation’s existence are protected, the danger of the state restraining exercise of religion or silencing speech is not a reality. There’s no danger of restraining exercise of religion unless the purpose of the corporation itself is frustrated.161
Courts are allowed to question the sanctity of corporate beliefs in a way
that is prohibited in analysis of human beliefs because the corporation is not a
natural person.162 When the realities of corporate governance are combined
with the realities of corporate existence, there is room for the state to place limits on the corporation that would not be allowed for natural persons.163 Court
decisions based on the aggregate theory that extend rights that only a corporeal
natural person can enjoy are offering duplicative protection to a class of individuals protected adequately elsewhere. This is because humans do not lose

157

See id. at 777–79.
Id. at 771; see also Blair & Stout, supra note 6, at 298.
159
Blair & Stout, supra note 6, at 288, 291. Because of the fiduciary duties of the directors,
which bind them to protect the interests of the corporation, when application of the hybrid
theory denies the corporation the ability to exercise a right, it is not depriving individuals of
a constitutional right by mere operation of contract or agreement.
160
See supra notes 150–56.
161
Under the hybrid theory, the “purpose” of the corporation would be defined both by the
official formation documents (articles of incorporation, charter, bylaws) as well as other
documents representing the purpose of the corporation, including board resolutions, corporate policies, and corporate public statements. Should a corporation represent its religious
purpose through documents and actions, then those rights for the corporation would be protected. The hybrid theory does not, however, protect the rights of “the people” who make up
the corporation because the corporation is the person.
162
See Winkler, supra note 12, at 866 (corporations have free speech rights more limited
than those held by individuals, and that have never been equal).
163
See infra notes 230–234 and accompanying text (describing the differences between allowable classifications of natural persons and artificial persons).
158

18 NEV. L.J. 811, CHATMAN - FINAL

838

5/15/18 12:28 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:811

their status when they put assets into or manage a corporation.164 The aggregate
theory gives rights to corporations they do not deserve because they physically
cannot enjoy them.165
III. PART THREE: MISAPPLICATION OF THE AGGREGATE THEORY
The portions of the Citizens United decision that advance the idea that the
corporation is a stand-alone entity does reflect the reality of corporate operations, but the premise that courts must protect the rights of shareholders acting
in the aggregate is divorced from that reality.166 When forming a corporation,
the incorporators make a choice of whether to go with default rules for shareholder involvement, to limit shareholder rights beyond the default terms, or to
allow shareholders greater power through voting measures and other changes to
corporate structure.167 The incorporators and initial investors have the full array
of terms and conditions at their disposal, within the limits of corporate and securities law, and typically they choose to limit shareholder involvement.168
These parties make a deliberate choice, and often choose to limit shareholder
power as much as possible to protect the operation of the corporation from
shareholder aggression.169 By operation of law and contract, shareholders are
divorced from the handling of their investment.170
For investors who are not the initial founders or are shareholders of a forprofit, publicly-traded corporation, rights are not the result of the collective decisions of an association of citizens.171 Instead, their rights are defined and
planned at the outset of incorporation, and they may either accept the terms and
purchase a financial stake in the corporation, or reject them by refusing to pur164

See Winkler, supra note 12, at 873 (“Even if the fictional entity . . . did not have constitutional rights . . . the actual persons behind the corporation—as John Marshall recognized almost 200 years ago—will continue to have them.”).
165
See, e.g., Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327,
337 (2014) (“The problem with the aggregate theory . . . is that the primary theoretical justification for limited liability is the separation of ownership and control by way of statutorily
designated overseers of corporate activity—the board of directors. If one ignores this separation and boils the corporation down to its shareholder owners, then one is essentially back to
a form of general partnership. . . .”). Under the hybrid theory, a corporation like Ruby, Inc.
or Hobby Lobby could “enjoy” religion if manifestations of the corporation itself show that
the corporation is engaging in religious exercise. The corporations could not avail themselves of freedom of religion merely because the founders, directors, officers, and employees
adhere to a given religion.
166
See supra Section I.B.
167
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 211 (2018) limits shareholder voting rights to election of
directors, approval of charter and bylaw amendments, and matters that fundamentally change
the structure of the corporation such as mergers, voluntary dissolution, or selling all of the
corporation’s assets. See also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 110, at 204.
168
See Schwartz, supra note 133, at 245–48.
169
Id. at 247–48; see also supra note 130 and accompanying text.
170
See Schwartz, supra note 133, at 246–48.
171
See id. at 238, 243–45.
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chase the stock.172 There are no accidental corporations and there are no accidental shareholders.173 Shareholders exercise their power when they deliberately choose to invest in the corporate form.174 This affirmative choice represents
an agreement to abandon control and entrust operations to directors and officers.175 Typically, when shareholders are disappointed in corporate performance,
they express their opinion by selling shares.176 Yet, the Court, through the aggregate theory, continue to consider the rights of shareholders, assigning them
the role of the people who make up the corporation, when analyzing corporate
rights.177
This Part analyzes the misuse of the aggregate theory, considering the true
nature of the role of shareholders in the corporation. There is minimal shareholder representation in corporate action, outside of their passive acceptance of
the corporation’s goals and the management of the directors and officers represented by the stock purchase.178 The nature of corporate governance is distorted
in court decisions that seek to grant constitutional rights to corporations. For
these reasons, cases like Citizens United, which grant corporations rights based
on the rights of the individuals who make up the corporation, are based on a
misconception about the nature of corporate rights.
A. Historical Use of the Aggregate Theory
Both scholars and the courts have expressed concern about the nature of
corporate rights. There has also been concern about the ability of the corporation to force a deviation from the original purpose of a constitutional right by
virtue of the mere size and impact of corporations.179 Like Justice Steven’s dissent in Citizens United, these concerns are often expressed in the dissent of major court decisions and rely on the artificial entity theory to justify limitations.180 Majority opinions tend to disregard the dangers posed by corporate
172

See id.
Id. at 243–44.
174
Id. at 271.
175
Id.
176
Notably, in today’s secondary market selling shares does not result in a reduction of corporate assets. See Stout, supra note 112, at 254.
177
See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014); Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 336–37, 386 (2010).
178
See supra note 111.
179
See Garrett, supra note 5, at 164 (providing a survey of corporate due process rights).
Garrett states that constitutional rights may be strongest when asserted by groups and not just
individuals. The cost of allowing artificial entities to assert rights at the expense of individuals without adequate representation can be too great for a constitutional democracy to permit.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Corporate Law Professors in Support of Respondents, supra note
117, at 21–24 (noting the risks of market manipulation for competitive reasons if corporations are allowed to exempt themselves from generally applicable laws based on the sincerely held beliefs of shareholders and others who make up the corporation).
180
See, e.g., Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 90 (1938) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
173
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influence, relying on the aggregate theory to advance the rights of shareholders,
and disregarding the impact of the corporation itself.181 After nearly 150 years
of expanding, arguably unjustifiably, corporate constitutional rights, the perceived overreach of Citizens United signals an opportunity to deviate from the
centuries-old pattern of blurring the line between corporations and natural persons, and of frustrating the purpose of constitutional rights.182
Before cases like Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, the aggregate theory
was primarily used to protect the property rights of shareholders as an association of citizens under the Due Process Clause.183 The Court was concerned with
the idea of taking property from individuals simply because they unite in the
corporate form.184 This concern, however, was misplaced. In all scenarios, the
rights of the corporation were adequately protected through operation of the artificial entity theory.185 The state granted property rights to the corporation at
the time of charter because property rights are incidental to the corporation’s
existence; thus, the state could not deny property rights after the corporation
was formed.186 This is similar to the holding for contractual rights in Dartmouth. There, Chief Justice Marshall noted that a state could not place limits on
rights once granted.187
Many of the due process property decisions involve the railroad industry.
For example, in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company,
the Court held that a corporation’s property could not be taxed differently from
that of a natural person.188 In San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., a railroad case that
preceded Santa Clara, a Federal District Court in California held, “whenever a
provision of the constitution, or of a law, guaranties to persons the enjoyment
of property, or affords to them means for its protection, or prohibits legislation
181

See Tucker, supra note 3, at 501–05 (discussing the evolution of the Court’s treatment of
corporations to recognize the rights of the people who make up the corporation).
182
See Chatman, supra note 2, at 60–62 (discussing the Court’s history expanding corporate
rights without justification). If the Court grants rights to corporations equal to the rights of
human beings, there is a danger of giving a corporation rights at the expense of the human
beings the constitution is designed to protect. See also Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at
587 (“Aggregate theory captures the reality that corporations must act and make decisions
through their human agents. However, the aggregate approach raises several challenging
questions, such as which human agents/natural persons should we aggregate? Everyone involved in the corporate enterprise? Or perhaps only the board, executives, and shareholders?
And if so, today’s shareholders, or the company’s original shareholders? As this last question suggests, the notion of perpetual corporate life is hard to reconcile with an aggregation
theory.”).
183
Chatman, supra note 2, at 60; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 40, at 1649. (“[T]he corporate personhood doctrine of Santa Clara represented an efficient way for the corporation
to assert the property rights of its shareholders.”); Pollman, supra note 5, at 658–59 (noting
the recognition of equal protection and due process rights based on the aggregate theory).
184
See Chatman, supra note 2, at 60–61.
185
Id. at 62–63.
186
Id. at 60–61.
187
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)518, 636−37 (1819).
188
Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 416 (1886).
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injuriously affecting it, the benefits of the provision extend to corporations.”189
While early courts viewed parts of due process for corporations as so essential
that it did not need justification or explanation, early courts explicitly limited
full expansion of corporate rights through the aggregate theory, excluding
“purely personal” rights. The courts carefully limited expansion, carving out
life or liberty, noting that those are only rights that natural persons may enjoy.190 Early cases drew distinctions amongst actors in a way that may be out of
line with more recent holdings.191
Even the earliest decisions demonstrate that the aggregate theory is not
necessary to adequately protect any of the rights of the corporation, including
property rights.192 Many of these cases also indicate the corporation’s property
rights as operation of the artificial entity theory.193 By referencing the rights of
the corporation itself, either through artificial entity or real entity theory, these
early decisions also demonstrated that protection of the property rights of the
people who make up the corporation is misplaced and unnecessary. The property protected in the railroad cases is the property held by corporations, not
shareholders. Further, many scholars have noted that “strict property rights”
cannot be applied to the ownership rights of the modern shareholder of large
corporations due to the secondary nature of share ownership.194 The operation
of the modern corporation confirms that granting rights in the aggregate disregards the realities of corporate governance.195

189

In addition to the aggregate theory, in Santa Clara and San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 13
F. 722, 744 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), the Court also granted corporations rights under the artificial
entity theory. The corporations were granted property rights during chartering: a state may
not impose unconstitutional limits on rights which it has granted. See San Mateo, 13 F. at
744 (“It would be a most singular result if a constitutional provision intended for the protection of every person against partial and discriminating legislation by the states, should cease
to exert such protection the moment the person becomes a member of a corporation. We
cannot accept such a conclusion.”).
190
See Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67, 68 (D. La. 1870) (“Only natural persons can
be born or naturalized; only natural persons can be deprived of life or liberty; so that it is
clear that artificial persons are excluded from the provisions of the first two clauses. . . .”).
191
See Chatman, supra note 2, at 60−62 (discussing historical limits on corporate personhood).
192
Id.
193
See San Mateo, 13 F. at 744.
194
See Berle, supra note 115, at 101−02 (The new role of shareholders has created a new
form of property. Shareholders are not motivated by entrepreneurship, but stock has more
socio-political implications. Corporations do not need the shareholder’s funds to operate,
taking the relationship outside the parameters of traditional economic relationships); Weinstein, supra note 57, at 310 (noting that by renouncing control and responsibility to management, shareholders have given up the right to have the corporation managed in their interest); Pollman, Constitutionalizing, supra note 5, at 672−73 (noting the flawed assumption
that corporations are all associational in nature).
195
See discussion supra Section II.A.; see also Gindis, supra note 126, at 274 (The corporation is not an object of property rights. Humans may own shares of a corporation, but no person possesses the corporation itself).
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B. The Aggregate Theory in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby
In Citizens United, Scalia and the majority did not consider whether the
speech rights under consideration could be enjoyed only by natural persons,
and skipped the question of whether corporations have the First Amendment
right at all.196 Assuming that a corporation’s First Amendment rights exist, the
Court advocated for the position of focusing on the right, not on who is invoking the right.197 While a corporation is not an actual citizen and cannot vote, the
majority ignored these facts, holding that the corporate voice is vital to political
discourse.198 Because the corporation is capable of speech protected by the
Constitution, the First Amendment right of a corporation could not be limited
simply because the words were not spoken by a citizen or a natural person.199
Thus, a corporation is capable of speech, capable of having its speech infringed
upon by the state, and deserves the same level of protection as any speaker
from such infringements.200 This premise is not found in the text of the Constitution or in precedent.201
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores202 illustrates how Citizens United declarations combined with the aggregate theory continues to improperly expand
rights based on incorrect beliefs regarding corporate governance.203 Hobby
Lobby suggested corporate rights are the pass through rights of the owners.204 A
corporation has constitutional rights as long as the persons making up the cor-

196

See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 33 (statement of Sotomayor, J.).
See supra notes 81−83 and accompanying text.
198
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
While courts have granted corporations free speech rights as far back as Chief Justice
Marshall in Dandridge, those rights were linked to how the corporation itself can speak—
through money, corporate writings. Those who are in support of the holding in Citizens
United emphasize that it is an opinion about the First Amendment, not a statement about
corporate law. See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, Citizens United and Its Critics, 120 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 77 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/citizens-united-and-its-critics [https://per
ma.cc/7BGS-FMMK]. The precedence cited by the Court in United does support First
Amendment rights for corporations, but tends toward speech that the corporation itself can
engage in. Citizens United takes these previous holdings, affirming free speech for corporation, and extrapolates to find that when analyzing rights, a court must ignore the nature of the
speaker. By ignoring corporate personhood, the Court is able to declare these cases as rightful precedence for the outcome of Citizens United. This, in essence, is why personhood matters. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2.
202
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
203
Id. at 2768−69. While Hobby Lobby is viewed by some to be an outlier because it applies
to a closely held corporation with a religious purpose, it is informative for how the Court
will analyze corporate personhood. Additionally, recent cases show the holding is expanding
beyond what the court indicated. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
204
See Garrett, supra note 5, at 96; see also June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the
Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 963, 1017−18 (2017) (Hobby Lobby erodes the social status of the
corporation by reducing it to an entity focused on the interests of its owners).
197
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poration have an indirect benefit.205 This use of the aggregate theory ignores the
realities of the corporate form, conflating for-profit companies with non-profit
religious organizations, and corporations with partnerships; this allows shareholders to have it both ways.206 The Hobby Lobby Court would have us believe
these distinctions are of no consequence.207 Justice Alito and the majority proposed that incorporators and shareholders can choose the profit maximizing,
dividend generating for-profit form, and apprise themselves of limited liability,
yet also protect their personal religious and speech rights indirectly through the
corporation.208
It is not clear from the Hobby Lobby holding if the Court is referring specifically to a statutory close corporation, or merely a corporation that is not
publicly traded.209 In a close corporation, the shareholders view themselves as
more than just shareholders and are instead involved in the management of the
business.210 Close corporations have thirty or fewer shareholders, one or more
restrictions on transfer, are not registered with the SEC, and make an explicit
election to be governed by the close corporation provision of the Delaware
General Corporate Law § 342.211 Shareholders expect to be actively involved in
management and operation of the corporation.212
Even if the Court is referring to close corporations, this should not change
how corporate rights are perceived in Hobby Lobby.213 Close corporation
founders are still choosing to avail themselves of the benefit of the corporate
form. Their duties are greater than shareholders in a larger corporation, but
those duties, based on the agency relationship among shareholders, are still
owed to other shareholders and the corporation itself, not third parties.214 The
shareholders in a close corporation are wearing many hats. They can be both
investors and managers. The roles assumed by shareholders in close corpora205

Id. at 964 (citing Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768).
Garrett, supra note 5, at 145.
207
Hobby Lobby, 132 S. Ct. at 2769.
208
Id. at 2769−70.
209
The Department of Labor, Department of Treasury, and Health and Human Services defined “closely held” for purposes of the Affordable Care Act following the Hobby Lobby decision. See Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 80
Fed. Reg. 134, 41323 (July 14, 2015).
210
F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, 1 O’NEAL’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.07, at
29–30 (3d. ed. 2002).
211
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 350, 351, 355 (2017). Shareholders govern the business and
affairs entirely. A minority of shareholders can be given the power to dissolve.
212
O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 210.
213
Hobby Lobby held that even a for-profit, non-religious corporation may have religion as a
purpose. If the corporation has such purpose, the corporation also has religious rights under
the First Amendment. A closely held, for-profit corporation may function as a reflection and
extension of the beliefs held by an aggregate of the owners. 134 S. Ct. at 2768−69, 2774−75.
214
See Stout, supra note 112, at 261 (Controlling shareholders in a close corporation have a
duty not to use their control over the corporation to cause the corporation to make payments
to them that the minority shareholders do not receive).
206
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tions, however, do not change the nature of the corporation itself.215 The distinctions between a more traditional corporation and a close corporation are reflective of the incorporators’ freedom to contract, as they chose the business
form most representative of their goals.
It is also a reflection of the state’s right to define business entities through
statutes. Even in a close corporation, the corporation is still legally separate
from individuals.216 The close corporation also maintains other characteristics
of a corporation, including perpetual life.217 Yet, the aggregate theory, as advanced by the Hobby Lobby majority, advocates for the opposite. The Court
suggests that while the responsibilities and obligations of individuals are altered
by the corporate form, the rights are not.218 The close corporation is still a corporation—the election does not change the nature of the corporation itself. If
we would not give corporate rights based on the interests of directors and officers alone in public or large corporations, we should not extend rights through
the aggregate theory to shareholders of a close corporation. The only difference
between close corporations and traditional corporations is the management
structure, not the corporate relationship with the government or third parties.219
Allowing the incorporators and shareholders to back track when convenient
should not be permissible.
The application of the aggregate theory in more recent holdings gives directors and officers constitutional protections simply because they serve as
agents and fiduciaries for the corporation. As discussed in the first Section of
this Part, since the Court is not protecting shareholders with the aggregate theory, the Court is giving double protection to an elite class of persons serving as
directors and officers.220 If the Court’s actions offer any protection to shareholders, such protections are duplicative rights earned simply by investments

215

See, e.g., Gindis, supra note 126, at 261 (Individuals assume roles on behalf of a corporation, and are even the face of the business, but that does not alter the definition of the corporation. They are assuming the roles on behalf of a real entity. The corporation is a coherent
and stable whole).
216
See, e.g., BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 10 (Close corporation is like a partnership choice for purpose of managing and monitoring agents. The ownership and control are
not separate, so the advantage is fewer agency costs. However, the shareholders lose the
benefits of being a public corporation, but not the benefits of the corporation generally); see
also Garrett, supra note 5, at 146 (“[N]othing could be more fundamental to modern corporate law than the complete separation of the owners from the legal entity itself. . . . [L]egal
separateness is the point of creating a corporation.”).
217
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 343 (2017) (A close corporation is formed in accordance
with general corporate laws, with the exception that the name shall state that it is a close corporation and shall include the provisions of § 343); § 102(a)(5) (A certificate of incorporation defaults to perpetual existence).
218
See discussion supra notes 199−205.
219
See, e.g., infra note 221.
220
See discussion supra Section II.A. See also Tucker, supra note 3, at 530 (noting the problems with applying the aggregate to corporate political speech).
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and wealth.221 The Court’s holdings are based on the protection of rights that
are impossible to exercise without a physical body and do not exist independent
of the natural persons behind the corporation.222 To continue the use of the aggregate theory found in Hobby Lobby and Citizens United is to continually
over-represent shareholders and management.
Applying the aggregate theory also disregards the intentions of state legislatures when they create corporations through statutes. The corporation is a
creature of the state, meaning that when courts decide the constitutional rights
of the artificial entity, they are deciding the rights of something that would not
exist without an exercise of state power. A corporation should only have religious or speech rights, such as that of a person, if the states have defined corporations in way that allows for such an interpretation. Looking past what states
intend the corporation to be and extending rights based on the people who
make up the corporation disregards the autonomy and power of the state to define its creation.223 It voids the agreement that went into effect between the state
and corporate founders when the corporation was formed.
Citizens United’s use of the aggregate theory to protect the rights of the individuals who make up the corporation and the lack of consideration given to
the entity exercising the right is flawed in two respects. First, it ignores that
there are legal, state defined differences between corporations, natural persons,
and other business entities. Then, it applies a theory of the corporation that does
not reflect the realities of corporate governance. Because Citizens United incorrectly defined the corporation, it also incorrectly analyzed the corporation’s
rights. The correct approach to corporate personhood and corporate rights incorporates the realities of corporate existence, defers to the state definitions of
the entity, and honors the choices made by corporate founders. The next Part
proposes a way forward that properly considers what a corporation is when determining corporate rights.

221

The Court has rejected the “shareholder protection” rationale due to its over-and underinclusiveness. See Tucker, supra note 3, at 514–15 (discussing the Court’s rejection of
shareholder protection in First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792−95, and in Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010)). As discussed in
supra Section II.A., majority shareholders tend to be corporate founders and institutional
investors, or corporate management—not individuals purchasing on the open market. The
corporate management and majority investor classes either have institutional backing or the
wealth necessary to be a party of the class.
222
Historically, speech rights of corporations have been acknowledged under the real entity
theory when the corporation speaks in ways in which a corporation can speak—writings and
official corporate statements. See, e.g., Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 64, 91−92 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting); discussion supra Section I.A. Under
the hybrid theory, speech rights would receive the same level of protection.
223
See, e.g., Blair & Pollman, supra note 49.
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IV. PART FOUR: THE HYBRID THEORY AND THE CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
TWO-STEP
The silver lining of the Citizens United decision is that it has been a catalyst in a movement to explore what a corporation is and to find a solution that
defines the corporation in a way that the people, through empowerment of the
state, can support. Any displeasure with the nature of corporate rights can be
remedied by allowing states to define their creation.224 The Court’s precedent,
as far back as Chief Justice John Marshall in Dartmouth, makes it clear that
states can redefine its creation—the corporation.225 This is because the Court is
deciding the rights of an artificial entity that would not exist without state power, but whose rights, both intentional and incidental, must be acknowledged
once formed. The Court cannot divorce an analysis of corporate constitutional
rights from an analysis of the legal status of corporations. The role of the Court
should be to simply interpret what the state intends.
The corporation is the creature of the state; therefore, states have the power
to fix the corporate personhood flaws in cases like Citizens United.226 States
have made judgments about the nuances of the corporate form, creating the
corporation, and defining the rights and responsibilities of incorporators, shareholders, directors, and officers.227 In exchange for the benefits of a corporation,
the humans who choose to unite in the corporate form create an entity completely separate from themselves.228 The entity created through this collaboration of the state and the natural person creates a new legal fiction embodied
with its own rights, limitations, and responsibilities.229 Determining the rights
224

For decades, many have proposed going further by amending the Constitution to clearly
state that corporations are not persons. For example, in 1988 Ralph Nader authored a piece
in the New York Times profiling the history of corporate constitutional rights and advocating
for a change. See Ralph Nader & Carl J. Mayer, Corporations Are Not Persons, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 9, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/09/opinion/corporations-are-not-persons.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=13520-41141].
225
Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
226
Scholars have agreed that Citizens United is an opportunity for state action. See, e.g.,
Pollman, Constitutionalizing, supra note 5, at 657 (Citizens United and Hobby Lobby are a
paradigm shift for the Court. They represent an opportunity for state law to resolve disputes
among corporate participants); Kent Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate Persons, 30
CONST. COMMENT. 309, 327−32 (2015) (Governance rules can alleviate concerns over corporate political speech). The approach of relying on the states, however, does not guarantee
that efforts will be taken to protect the rights of individuals over corporations.
227
See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am. 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987) (Court has made numerous proclamations regarding constitutional rights over the years, it is clear that “the corporation . . . owes its existence and attributes to state law.”). See also Mayer, supra note 40,
at 584 n.36 (citing T. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 11 (1984)); Garrett, supra note 5,
at 105.
228
Garrett, supra note 5, at 108.
229
Since corporations are creatures of the state, federal courts historically have been leery of
interfering with what was defined by the states under law. See Garrett, supra note 5, at 105;
Ciepley, supra note 77, at 225−42 (Corporations are constituted by government. They thus
have no preexisting rights to reserve. Without reserved rights, and without any express rights
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associated with this special relationship requires a court to analyze the facts and
give consideration to evidence of the corporation’s formation and operations.
This Part proposes a way forward in corporate rights analysis by using the
two-step analysis to fully recognize the hybrid nature of the corporation. First,
this Part defines what is involved should the Court start at step one in its analysis of the corporate form as it exists now. Then, this Part discusses the true nature of the corporation, considering step one analysis, to highlight how states
can redefine their creation as stand-alone new entities that exist at the pleasure
of the state, a hybrid of artificial and real entity theory. It concludes by applying the hybrid theory to Ruby, Inc.
A. Defining Step One: Considering the True Nature of the Corporation
The Constitution is written for human beings, not entities. To give corporations rights, a fiction must be created to imprint human characteristics onto the
corporation. Corporate rights are a fact question that will always require courts
to engage in a fact-intensive analysis because of the nature of corporate personhood. Step one of the two-step analysis requires the Court to examine how the
corporation is founded, and how the corporation operates. Corporate personhood and corporate rights cannot be presumed, especially rights based on beliefs such as religion. If a clear proclamation of rights is desired, outside of the
two-step analysis, state and federal legislature must take similar steps regarding
the definition of rights that accompany personhood.
To define the corporate person and other artificial persons, it is helpful to
consider how we define natural persons. The logical definition of person includes any human being possessing a physical body, without concern for age,
gender, race, or nationality.230 How to classify natural persons for legal purposes is in many ways as logical as how to define them. States categorize people
by age, mental capacity, and other constitutionally acceptable legal classifications.231 When states classify persons, however, they are working with entities
that are not creatures of the state, but who are instead the creators of the state.232

granted in the constitutional context to corporate entities, it makes no sense for corporations
to claim constitutional rights against the government). See also Garrett, supra note 5, at 105
n.43 (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014)) (“discussing how courts will ‘turn to’ the ‘underlying state’ corporate law when ‘resolving disputes’ ”).
230
See Person, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARY, https:/en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/per
son [https://perma.cc/5PMF-XZM5] (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) (defining person as “[a] human being regarded as an individual”).
231
To determine whether a classification is legally acceptable, the courts engage in a factintensive analysis of state action, applying one of three tests. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 504 (1974) (“the equal protection clause is violated by discriminatory laws
relating to the status of birth where classification is justified by no legitimate state interest”).
232
See Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 375 (1855).

18 NEV. L.J. 811, CHATMAN - FINAL

848

5/15/18 12:28 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:811

As such, the state does not have the power to eliminate a human being’s existence.233
In contrast, states do have the power to eliminate a business organization’s
existence because they are creatures of the state, with rights that are not recognized until the state acknowledges the formation documents, or until they engage in actions the state has deemed to meet the threshold for recognition as a
business form.234 They are governed by the terms of formation documents and
the mandatory terms contained in statutes. Because of the state’s role in a company’s recognition and formation, all formal business entities are hybridized
artificial entities.235 Once formed, every entity, from the limited partnership to
the corporation, operates in the world limited by how the state has defined it.236
233

Dodge, 331 U.S. (18 How.) at 375 (“Individuals are not the creatures of the State, but
constitute it. They come into society with rights, which cannot be invaded without injustice.”).
234
Id. There are two default entities discussed that operate as alter egos of human beings
and, therefore, cannot be eliminated by the state. Individuals do business alone and in collaboration with other natural persons without the intervention of the state. Sole proprietorships and general partnerships are default entities that exist when one or more individuals do
business without complying with state filing requirements. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 16202(a) (no filings required to form a general partnership and be governed by the default
rules, but many file a statement of partnership); JAMES F. FOTENOS & EDWARD C. RYBKA,
CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CORPORATIONS (2018) §§ 2:3–2:8 (“A sole proprietorship is
not a legal entity” separate from its owner and does not file a formation document; the owner
must file a fictitious name certificate if doing business under a name that does not include
the business owner’s name). States’ laws governing the treatment of sole proprietorships and
partnerships exist in the common law and in business codes, but the laws do not define the
entities in the same way that they define entities with limited liability. Even though the state
may recognize a separate business name or entity, partnerships and sole proprietorships operate like alter egos in their purest forms.
235
See Thierry Kirat, The Firm Between Law and Economics: An Overview of Selected Legal-economic Scholars of the Past, in THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR
ECONOMICS, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW, supra note 17, at 131–32 (“A realistic theory of
the enterprise should be based on two crucial dimensions: its aspect as an entity or institution, subject to the rules of law and developing its own internal rules; and its role as the operator of the creation and distribution of revenues, and of innovation, thus the economic dynamic”). The hybrid theory takes these two factors into consideration by first acknowledging
that the corporation is in fact a creature of the state, then filling in the gaps of the artificial
entity/concession theory and recognizing that, once formed, the corporation is a fully functioning independent entity.
236
Other entities with limited liability, such as the limited partnership (LP), limited liability
partnership (LLP), limited liability company (LLC) also cannot be formed by default. To
avoid the fate of sole proprietorships and general partnerships, individuals further formalize
business relationships, and avail themselves of the benefits of state-defined business forms
like the corporation, by complying in full with formation requirements found in state business codes. Failure to follow statutory requirements results in the corporation being treated
like a default entity. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 306(c) (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 18 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15 (2018). The
business trust, which may be formed by contract alone, does offer some characteristics of
corporations, including limited liability, but has fallen out of favor since corporate laws have
been modernized. See Carla L. Reyes, Distributed Autonomous Business Organizations 25–
26 (unpublished draft) (on file with author) (citing John Morley, The Common Law Corpora-
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After formation, to determine how to further define the entity, one must look at
how it operates and relates to third parties.237 Corporate personhood jurisprudence based on the aggregate theory is based on a misunderstanding of corporate laws and governance because it fails to look at how the corporation operates after it is formed.238
Beginning with the decisions and dissents written by Chief Justice Marshall in the 1800s, courts have been starting at step two of corporatepersonhood analysis, defining the corporation as an assumed person then analyzing the parameters of the right.239 The desire to adequately protect corporate
interests is largely based on a flawed understanding of corporate governance
and has resulted in the Court never considering whether the persons being protected are deserving of, or in need of, additional protection.240 Cases like Citizens United accept corporate rights and personhood status as a foregone conclusion, making it difficult to determine at any given moment what rights a
corporation actually has and what limitations are imposed on those rights.241
Viewing the corporation as a person is necessary for many laws and regulations to have the intended effect, and typically it is the state or federal legislatures that decide when corporate personhood is necessary. Legislators draft
state and federal statutes to include the corporation in the definition of a person
without regard to how such classifications may impact the constitutional definition or rights of the corporation; instead, they make a conscientious decision
that a statute should not apply equally to artificial persons.242 The statutes

tion: The Power of the Trust in Anglo-American Business History, 116 COL. L. REV. 2145,
2146 (2016)) (comparing the business trust to the corporation).
237
Reyes, supra note 236.
238
See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 2 (“[V]oting rules of corporations suggest that
corporations are democratic institutions. . . . [H]owever, the reality of the large corporation is
far from democratic, because shareholders rarely have the incentive to exercise their legal
rights.”). See also, e.g., Pollman, Constitutionalizing, supra note 5 (explaining the state role
in corporate governance); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 253 (explaining founder’s intent
regarding constitutional and corporate rights).
239
See discussion supra Part I. See also Winkler, supra note 12, at 867 (Corporate constitutional rights are not based in corporate personhood).
240
See discussion supra Part II.
241
See Ciepley, supra note 77, at 222−23 (Professor Ciepley believes the rights of a corporation are purely contractual, corporations have no constitutional rights). See also Amicus
Curiae Brief of Corp. & Criminal Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note 4, at
28 (discussing how application of RFRA to corporations frustrates corporate law). While I
believe that corporations do have constitutional rights for reasons that are based in more than
contract, I disagree with the Court’s use of a case that should be founded in corporate law,
like Citizens United or Hobby Lobby, to make a general point about freedom of speech or
freedom of religion. The Court’s analysis of those rights in both cases would be correct if it
was applied to human beings.
242
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1) (2012) (Person: “The term ‘person’ shall be construed
to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.”); U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(27) (“ ‘Person’ means an individual, corporation, business
trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, govern-
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acknowledge that some human activity must be given equal protection, regardless of the nature of the person engaging in the activity.243 Many statutes also
make a distinction between a human actor, a citizen actor, and an artificial entity actor.244 These distinctions, properly created by state and federal legislators,
are justified by the Constitution and fit within theories of corporate personhood.
But when Courts provide the corporations with these same rights as defined by
statute, they are interpreting the intention of the drafters of the statute.245 Problems arise in corporate personhood when the courts give rights to corporations
that states, legislatures, and corporate founders did not intend.
Through business codes and case law, states have clearly defined the distinctions between entities and natural persons, along with the differences between the various business entities.246 If the Court acknowledges how corporations function, it can develop a corporate personhood theory that grants
corporate rights equal to natural persons where appropriate, yet upholds appropriate state limitations that reflect the nature of the corporation. Viewing the
corporation as a real entity limited by the realities of the corporate form as defined by state law, may reconcile Citizens United with jurisprudence that allows
the state to draw distinctions between natural persons and corporations. Recognition of the realities of how corporations are formed and managed will allow
the Court to start in the right place when analyzing corporate rights, developing
an accurate and binding theory of corporate personhood.
The operation of the hybrid theory enables the Court to acknowledge the
duality of corporate existence. Over the years, Justices have questioned why the
Court has not started at step one as contemplated by the hybrid approach: determining which constitutional protections are incidental to a corporation’s very
existence.247 The Court has simply claimed any theory of corporate personhood
when convenient to grant or deny rights, or to affirm or disagree with a prior
decision. By starting at step one and defining the corporation, the Court will
ment, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other
legal or commercial entity.”).
243
See 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1); U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(27).
244
The clearest distinction between natural persons and artificial persons appears in the
Fourteenth Amendment. Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67, 68 (D. La. 1870) (interpreting parts of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply only to human beings: “Only natural persons can be born or naturalized; only natural persons can be deprived of life or liberty; so
that it is clear that artificial persons are excluded from the provisions of the first two clauses. . . .”); see also Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906). Corporations
have also found that only natural persons may avail themselves of the privilege against selfincrimination and citizen status for purposes of privileges and immunities protection. See
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 586 (1839) (privileges and immunities).
245
Professor Pollman believes that Citizens United and Hobby Lobby look to state corporate
law as a means for resolving corporate constitutional rights. See Pollman, Constitutionalizing, supra note 5, at 669.
246
See supra notes 236−37.
247
See Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory, supra note 92, at 853; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 33 (statement of Sotomayor, J.).
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have less wiggle room and will give corporate constitutional law decisions
more weight and clarity.248 The beauty of starting at step one is that it has the
benefit of properly analyzing corporate rights while avoiding blanket proclamations that endanger the proper balance between corporations and third parties.
This allows the courts to consider how the corporation was formed, how it was
governed, and what the state and incorporators intended. Corporate rights are
case-by-case and fact dependent, but the nature of the corporation can be resolved by recognizing the corporation’s dual nature.
Step one requires that the Court give deference to the role of the state by
considering both the state’s role in formation and the corporation’s stand-alone
status. Before granting corporate rights the Court should first consider whether
a right is of the type necessary to protect the corporation itself, not the people
who make up the corporation.249 As illustrated by the ownership of Hobby
Lobby and the nature of the business, Hobby Lobby is not a religious entity or
non-profit whose very existence is based on the exercise of religion.250 Instead
it is a corporation with a charitable purpose and mission in addition to other
more common corporate goals.251 Freedom of religion is not incidental to Hobby Lobby’s existence, nor is the exercise of religion implicit in what is granted
by Hobby Lobby’s corporate charter.252 Instead of considering what is inherent
for the people who found and operate a corporation, the Court should consider
what is inherent for the corporation itself.
Step one also requires the Court to consider what rights are incidental to
the corporate charter. This is because the corporation is an artificial entity
bound by the rights granted by the state and altered by the foundational corporate contracts: the corporate charter, bylaws, and resolutions.253 By operation of
law, actions that are explicitly included in the corporation’s business purpose

248

See Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory, supra note 92, at 859−60; Gordon,
supra note 34. Professor Chemerinsky notes that it would be difficult to avoid applying the
Citizens United holding to other contexts related to speech and non-citizens. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2. There is similar room to apply the decision in other corporate
law contexts. See Chatman, supra note 2.
249
See Gindis, supra note 126, at 266 (“[t]he firm is not simply an aggregate or a collection.
It is a real integrated entity and a dynamic causal system. . . . Firms are real entities that need
to be theoretically treated as such.”).
250
See America’s Largest Private Companies, FORBES.COM, https://www.forbes.com/compa
nies/hobby-lobby-stores/ [https://perma.cc/6F4T-WKVF] (last visited Apr. 21, 2018); TopPrivate Companies, BIZJOURNALS.COM, http://companies.bizjournals.com/profile/hobbylobby/135823/ [https://perma.cc/FK77-DRXL] (last visited Apr. 21, 2018) (Hobby Lobby is
one of the largest private companies, with over 600 stores that sells arts and craft supplies).
251
In court filings, Hobby Lobby is described as “an arts-and-crafts chain,” and a closely
held family business organized as a general corporation under Oklahoma law. See Brief for
Respondents at 1–2, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13354 & 13-356).
252
Id.
253
See discussion supra Section I.A.
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cannot be restricted once the charter is granted.254 In addition, actions that are
required to conduct the business detailed in the charter cannot be restricted.255
This includes the ability to speak through corporate documents and spending,
and the ability to contract, own property, and sue and be sued.256
To start at step one when determining whether a right exists for the corporation, the Court should also consider what additional responsibilities accompany rights.257 All rights come with responsibilities, but it is difficult to assign
responsibility to a shareholder, officer, or director when a corporation exercises
freedom of speech or freedom of religion based on the aggregate theory.258
Shareholders, directors, and officers are all protected from various levels of responsibility by the existence of the corporation and the contracts between the
corporation and its agents and owners.259 A shareholder is only held personally
liable when a controlling shareholder uses his position to oppress the minority
shareholder’s interests.260 When the founders of Ruby, Inc. abandon partnership
for the corporate form, they give up the power to control the corporation
through their ownership interests, but also give up the responsibilities that accompany that control. There are no shareholder duties through the rights they
exercise in the aggregate, unlike the partners in a partnership.261 As a result of
the realities of the corporate form, the Court extends additional rights to shareholders, officers, and directors without any additional responsibilities.262
As is evident from the earliest corporate decisions, clearly the founders and
early courts envisioned a corporation subject to some level of state control.263
Two-step analysis allows the Court to continue to advance the principal that the
corporation that credits its existence to terms mandated by the state should also
be subject to the control of the state, while also allowing the Court to
254

Id.
Id.
256
Prior to Citizens United, the courts recognized that corporations have First Amendment
rights to freedom of speech and freedom of the press, Fifth Amendment protection from unreasonable takings, Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 775−76, 778 n.14 (1978) (First Amendment); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76
(1906) (Fourth Amendment); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896)
(Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment); Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 409−10
(1886) (Fourteenth Amendment).
257
See, e.g., Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with Responsibilities: Personal Jurisdiction
in the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 126–27 (2013).
258
Id. at 136−37. See also, Chatman, supra note 2, at 87.
259
See discussion, supra Section II.A.
260
See FAIRFAX, supra note 113, at 26. See also supra notes 205−11 and accompanying text.
261
See discussion, supra Section II.A.
262
Under aggregate theory some rights are extended to corporations through the people who
make up the firm, but under ethical rules, representation and privileges belong to the corporation not the employees, officers, or directors. How can the corporation assume the right on
behalf of the individuals, but not be required to protect the individuals when a violation occurs? See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1983).
263
See discussion, supra Section I.A.
255
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acknowledge that by granting the corporation’s existence the state creates a
new independent entity with rights incidental to that existence.264 By looking at
the way corporations are formed and operate, the Court may advance a cohesive theory of corporations that grants rights to corporations when required, but
does not presume, as in Citizens United,265 that corporations must be equal to
natural persons in all ways. The hybrid theory, with its two-step analysis and
embodiment of the dual nature of corporate existence, provides the framework
necessary to properly analyze corporate rights.
B. A Hybrid Theory
The enduring scholarly debate on corporate personhood disincentivizes the
Court from stating explicitly what theory it subscribes to at any given moment.266 Once the Court identifies a theory, the decision faces immediate scrutiny by scholars who oppose the theory referenced.267 Much of the personhoodbased criticism and support of Citizens United is based on how it reinforces a
chosen corporate-personhood theory. The reality is that corporations, like natural persons, are no single thing.268 Just as a human being can be both a child and
a parent, a corporation has elements of more than one personhood theory depending on the context.269 This phenomenon is reinforced by the fact that corporate personhood is itself a legal fiction. To properly define the corporation’s
personhood in order to determine its access to constitutional rights, we must
properly acknowledge the parameters used by legislators and the corporate
founders to define the corporation’s purpose.
Those opposed to Citizens United that advocate to eliminate the constitutional rights of the corporation through complete disavowal of corporate personhood are unnecessarily overcorrecting, just as efforts by those in support of
Citizens United to recognize corporations as equal to human beings are analytically overreaching. 270 The corporation is a real, stand-alone entity, defined by
the state corporate laws and with rights that come with that position.271 Corporations have constitutional rights incidental to their right to own property, to

264

Id.
See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
266
See Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory, supra note 92, at 849 n.80.
267
See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 201.
268
See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 57 at 33 (“The firm exists in its own right, as a specific
entity, beyond the changing personalities of shareholders, workers and managers”); see also,
e.g., Gordon, supra note 34.
269
Id.
270
The literature critiquing and supporting Citizens United and corporate personhood generally is too vast to cite adequately. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120
YALE L.J. 978 (2011); Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right
That Big Corporations Should Have but Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639
(2011).
271
See supra notes 56−66 and accompanying text.
265
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sue and be sued, enter into contracts, and otherwise function in society.272
However, extending rights to corporations based on the rights of the citizens
who make up the corporation in the aggregate is a mischaracterization of the
corporate form.273 This approach allows the corporation and its natural persons
to have it both ways, taking advantage of all of the perks of separateness while
maintaining the rights they would receive if they simply chose to unite in a
partnership. The corporation functions as a hybrid of the artificial entity theory
and real entity theory.
Regardless of the legal fictions created, corporations do not share all aspects of natural persons and do not need the same level of protection. Corporations are embodied with rights based solely on their form. Perpetual life, limited liability, fully alienable shares, and a transient ephemeral nature all provide
corporations with greater opportunities legally.274 The persons who make up a
corporation and who may extend their rights to the corporation through Citizens
United and Hobby Lobby have not been required to assume responsibility personally for the obligations of the corporation.275 Many of the foundational protections of the Constitution are provided to corporations and their directors and
officers based on the nature of the corporate form.276 Thus, extending all rights
to the corporation transforms it into a super citizen with more rights and advantages than the natural person.277
The corporation is a stand-alone, real entity, with rights tempered by its
concessions to the state at the time of formation and the physical realities of its
existence.278 Corporations can sue and be sued, they can enter into contracts,
they can own property, and, per Citizens United, they can speak through their
spending. The corporation can do these things without reliance on the rights of
its natural people—the shareholders, officers, and directors. The corporation is
also a Dartmouth firm—defined by its agreement with the state, and limited in
the exercise of some rights by the state-mandated terms of its existence. The
state could, in theory, abolish corporations, or refuse to allow corporations to
do business within the state’s borders or obtain rights as foreign corporations in
a jurisdiction.279 Thus, the corporation’s mere existence is at the pleasure of the
states. Yet, after states grant corporations the pleasure, the state cannot deny the
272

See supra notes 183–87 and accompanying text.
See discussion, supra Section III.B.
274
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 144.
275
See Michalski, supra note 257.
276
See discussion, supra Section II.A.
277
See, e.g., Sprague & Wells, supra note 108.
278
See also Weinstein, supra note 57 at 33 (“The firm exists in its own right, as a specific
entity, beyond the changing personalities of shareholders, workers and managers.”).
279
For a discussion of the fundamental rights of states and the limits placed on Congress by
the Constitution to infringe on those rights, see Timothy Zick, Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental “States’ Rights,” 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 213, 255
(2004) (States have fundamental rights to order their intimate affairs, including the right to
contract).
273
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corporation rights that are inherent and incidental to its legally authorized existence and activities. This duality allows the corporation to be both an artificial
entity and a real entity simultaneously, depending on the rights asserted and the
context.
A corporation, however, is not a citizen, can never be a citizen per the
Fourteenth Amendment, and should never be granted rights incidental to citizenship.280 A corporation is not born and it lacks the physical body contemplated by the Amendment. It cannot vote, it cannot physically be imprisoned, and it
cannot physically exercise religion through worship or reflection. A corporation
may only be punished by infringements on its rights to exist, to contract, or to
do business within a jurisdiction.281 Corporate consequences are not impositions on a physical body. When a person is held liable for corporate actions, it
is based on their individual role in the activity, not those taken by the corporation itself. For this reason, rights should be limited to what the state grants and
what a corporation can do independent of its human agents.
Rights that are purely personal or purely corporeal should not be extended
to the corporation through the aggregate theory. There is no need to recognize
the constitutional rights of shareholders or officers through the corporation. Instead, the Court should recognize the financial and fiduciary rights embodied
by corporate and contract law. In other words, a corporation has no human
rights—no religion, no race, no gender, no sexuality, no disability, no body to
wrongfully imprison, and no right to exist at all if the state revises the agreement or the corporation fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the
state. Because the corporation lacks the physical body, it does not need the
same protections as the people who make up the corporation.
The corporation is a real entity, and, like a natural person, it is not born
with all rights. The corporation differs from the natural person in that it may
never become a full citizen of an appropriate age to avail itself of all Constitutional rights. The corporation is limited by what the state intended to create,
and the realities of how the corporation operates. Instead of viewing the corporation as a person with rights incidental to the rights of individuals, the Court
should return to the original artificial-entity view which maintains states’ rights
to form and exercise control of the corporation, while also acknowledging any
rights that naturally flow from its existence as a real recognized legal entity.
States may define through statutes which rights it intends only for human beings, and which are intended for all persons, both natural and artificial.282

280

See Chatman supra note 2, at 70.
Id.; see also Pollman, Constitutionalizing, supra note 5, at 642, 647–48.
282
Some states have already made efforts to amend their RFRA’s to ensure that the holding
in Hobby Lobby will apply. See, e.g., S.B. 975, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015);
S. Enrolled Act 50, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015); S. Enrolled Act 101,
119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015).
281
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C. Ruby, Inc.: A Hindu Hospitality Company
When the founders of Ruby, Inc. transition from a partnership, they create
a new legal person with rights and responsibilities divorced from the rights and
responsibilities of the shareholders, directors, officers, and employees of Ruby,
Inc. The people involved in Ruby, Inc. are either acting on behalf of the corporation, acting in the best interest of the corporation, providing the capital necessary for Ruby, Inc. to exist, or taking their share of any returns on their investment. The human beings involved with Ruby, Inc. do not define the corporation
or own the corporation.283 They are instead a part of the system that allows this
new entity to exist and survive.284 Thus, to determine the rights of Ruby, Inc.,
the corporate person, Ruby, Inc., must be legally defined in a way that is distinct from its people.
Corporate law does not allow Ruby, Inc. to be an aggregate entity that is a
representative of the people who make up the corporation. Unlike Ruby Partners, which was owned and controlled by the partners, Ruby, Inc. is distinct
and new, with shareholders owning equity in the corporation and directors and
officers managing the day-to-day operations. The managers are required to operate in a way that protects the best interests of the corporation.285 The directors
and officers are advancing the beliefs and missions of the corporation, but not
the individual beliefs of the shareholders.286 This new state-created creature
must operate within the parameters placed upon its existence by the state, but is
otherwise a separate and fully recognized entity.287
Citizens United disregards this basic tenet of corporate law, and would allow the founders of Ruby, Inc. to have it both ways just because the rights that
the Court believes flow through the corporation to its people are in question.
Under the aggregate theory, the Court would look through Ruby, Inc. to the
shareholders of Ruby to determine whether the dietary restrictions are a part of
those people’s rights of free exercise. Application of the aggregate theory seeks
to ensure that the rights of human beings are protected in every scenario, even
when those individuals are not a legally recognized part of the organization’s
reality. Because the founders, shareholders, directors, and officers of Ruby, Inc.
283

See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 591 (Noting that because a corporation is an
artificial person, it cannot be owned just like a human being cannot be owned. What shareholders own are shares in the corporation, not the corporation itself).
284
Id.
285
In fact, corporate statutes focus on the independence of directors and provide a means for
protecting them from proper business decisions that contradict the intentions of shareholders.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101–398, 141(a) (2017); see also Belinfanti & Stout, supra,
note 63, at 622 (explaining that most of the deference to shareholders in Supreme Court decisions is mere dicta, and the Court instead defers to management judgment under the paradigm of the business judgment rule); see also, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (directors must
protect interests of corporations and serve as trustees of stockholders).
286
See supra Section III.A.
287
See supra Section IV.B.
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are practicing and promoting Hinduism, the Court would protect this alleged
exercise at Ruby, Inc. This outcome would be acceptable if Ruby were still a
partnership, but given the difference between a partnership and a corporation, a
different approach is necessary to properly define the rights of Ruby, Inc.
For a partnership, application of the artificial entity theory and the aggregate theory is reasonable. The partnership is, quite literally, an association of
citizens, or, at the least, persons. So, it would be acceptable for a court to look
through Ruby Partners to the people who make the Ruby partnership. For a
corporation, designed to stand alone after formation, combining the artificial
entity theory with the aggregate theory is far less reasonable. Instead, courts
should acknowledge the power of the state through the artificial entity theory
and the separate nature of the corporation through the real entity theory.
The opening hypothetical serves to illustrate the differences between the
hybrid theory and the aggregate theory.288 Under the hybrid theory, step one requires the court to apply the artificial entity theory to first consider how the
corporation was defined by statutes to determine what was granted or implied
by the state at the time Ruby, Inc. was incorporated. Then, the court would apply the real entity theory and look to Ruby, Inc., as a stand-alone real entity, to
determine whether state action infringes on a right that exists for the corporation itself. Under the hybrid theory the thoughts, emotions, and beliefs held by
the Ruby, Inc. directors and officers would not influence a determination of the
religious exercise of Ruby, Inc. Application of the hybrid theory makes bestowing corporations with rights that only human beings can physically enjoy more
difficult because it requires the corporation to engage in activities representative of their rights.289 The hybrid theory gives the Court less wiggle room,
which results in corporate constitutional law decisions with more weight and
clarity.290
To analyze corporate rights under the hybrid theory requires two steps:
first, determine what is granted by the state at the time of incorporation, then
analyze what rights are incidental to the corporation’s existence. The hypothet-

288

In partnerships, even partnerships with limited liability protections, at least one partner is
actively involved in the management of the company. A Limited Liability Partnership (LLP)
is a general partnership that has filed a statement of qualification. In all states except for
South Carolina and Louisiana, it provides a liability shield to partners, protecting them from
personal liability for partnership obligations. It is governed by the same statutes as partnerships and taxed the same as a partnership but requires a formal filing to make the partnership
more than a general partnership. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 306(c).
289
See discussion supra Part IV (Outlining the differences between human beings and artificial persons, and fully explaining step one analysis).
290
See Gordon, supra note 34; Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory, supra note 92
at 859. Professor Chemerinsky notes that it would be difficult to avoid applying the Citizens
United holding to other contexts related to speech and non-citizens. CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 2. There is similar room to apply the decision in other corporate law contexts. See also
Chatman, supra note 2, at 72.
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ical notes that at incorporation, Ruby, Inc. is formed for only legal purposes.291
The incorporators did not choose to spell out the advancement and promotion
of Hinduism or vegetarianism in the corporate charter. Thus, under the artificial
entity theory, the Hindu religion is not a protection granted by the state at the
time of incorporation. Further, the need to practice and promote a religion is
not incidental to what is granted by the State of Delaware when Ruby, Inc. is
incorporated. Under the artificial entity theory, the founders of Ruby, Inc. will
not be able to use the exercise of religion to justify its vegetarian policies.
Depending on what is documented and promoted by Ruby, Inc. in its charter, bylaws, board resolutions, corporate policies, mission statements, manuals,
official board minutes, and other items that make up and represent Ruby, Inc.,
the corporation may be able to avail itself of religious protection through the
real entity theory. The hybrid theory also requires analysis of corporate actions
on the premise that Ruby, Inc. is a stand-alone entity embodied with its own
distinct and separate rights. Under the real entity theory, the court would look
to Ruby, Inc. itself to determine whether it is promoting and advancing Hinduism and vegetarianism. Ruby, Inc. has well-known vegetarian restaurants, explains its policy in communications with its guests, and requires compliance on
the premises. Assuming this belief is also represented in corporate meeting
minutes and other representations of corporate intent produced by the agents of
the corporation, Ruby, Inc. may be able to avail itself of religious protection. In
step two, if the Court determines that the activity of the corporation itself is
worthy of constitutional protection, it would then look to see if a state action
has improperly infringed upon that right.
This hypothetical illustrates that at times the hybrid theory may result in
the same outcome as the aggregate theory. If Ruby is found to have a right
based on the first step of the hybrid analysis, it may avail itself of rights associated with the exercise of religion. Similarly, if instead rights were granted to
Hobby Lobby based on how Hobby Lobby is formed and how it operates, as
opposed to the religious beliefs of the people who make up Hobby Lobby, it
would be an appropriate outcome under the hybrid theory. What is significant
about the hybrid theory is not the outcome, it is that it properly apportions
rights to the corporation itself while giving adequate deference to state power.
Instead of looking through the corporation to the people who make up the corporation, the hybrid theory looks at what is granted by the state (artificial entity
theory) or what actions are taken by the corporation (real entity theory). The
291

Corporate statutes under both the MBCA and the DGCL allow for corporations to be
formed for general purposes. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8 § 102(a)(3) (2017); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2016). Historically, corporations were required to be more specific when
defining the corporate purpose. The general purposes designation is an affirmative choice by
founders, used to avoid the risk of falling prey to the ultra vires doctrine. Thus, if a corporation desired to be bound and limited by the religious convictions or other parameters of the
corporate founder’s choosing, there is a body of law that supports and enforces those choices. See ERIC A. CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 385–87 (3d ed.
2014) (discussing the decline of the ultra vires doctrine and rise of general purpose statutes).
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hybrid theory also starts at step one instead of step two and working backwards—instead of looking at whether the right is one the corporation deserves
to have first, then working backwards to find a justification, the court would
instead look at what the corporation is and what it does to determine rights. Utilizing the hybrid theory ensures a proper analysis of the rights of corporations
as they relate to natural persons and the states.
The two-step analysis is fact intensive because corporations are man-made
entities and personhood is a legal fiction. The facts and evidence necessary to
confirm how the corporation is defined at the time of formation is defined by
states. In step two, the trier of fact can determine how much weight should be
given to representations of the corporations. Because corporations are fictional
people, a court may question aspects of a corporation’s life that would be constitutionally forbidden for natural persons. The hybrid theory requires courts to
do the two-step analysis to determine corporate rights because to give purely
human rights to non-humans should require adequate evidence of human behavior.
Application of the hybrid theory also highlights the power of the state to
correct results that are outside of what it intended for its creation. In Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, Chief Justice John Marshall limited the
state’s ability to deviate from what it agreed to at the time the corporation was
founded, acting against Dartmouth individually and invalidating the operation
of its corporate charter.292 The state could, however, redefine the corporation in
its enabling statutes.293 In many ways, Dartmouth took a hybrid approach. The
state was bound by what it agreed to in its contract with the corporation and its
founders, but because the corporation was a creature of the state, it could redefine the very nature of the corporation.294 When the Dartmouth corporation engaged in allowable activities within the scope of what the state granted, those
activities had legal protection derived from the corporation itself. What was
true about the corporation in 1819 is true for the nature of the relationship between states and corporations today. States may define through statutes which
rights it intends only for human beings, and which it intends for all persons,
both natural and artificial.295 Courts must analyze the facts surrounding the corporation’s existence through the two-step analysis to give proper deference to
state and corporate founder intentions.

292

See supra text accompanying notes 41–45 for full discussion of Dartmouth.
Id.
294
In Dartmouth, Chief Justice Marshall notes that altering the statute defining corporations
is an option for the state of New Hampshire. Since all states require corporations to regularly
update the state and file reports to remain in existence, it is possible for states to impose
some requirements retroactively. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 502, 510–511 (2017).
295
Some states have already made efforts to amend their RFRA’s to ensure that the holding
in Hobby Lobby will apply. See, e.g., supra note 282.
293

18 NEV. L.J. 811, CHATMAN - FINAL

860

5/15/18 12:28 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:811

CONCLUSION
A simple analysis of how corporations are formed and how they operate
explains the flaws in the Court’s corporate-rights analysis over the years. These
erroneous decisions happen because the Court has, in part, disregarded business
principles and corporate law when issuing corporate-constitutional decisions.
Instead of focusing on state power and corporate structure, the Court focuses on
constitutional theory, taking a right-by-right, and in some circumstances, a
case-by-case approach, that is divorced from the facts surrounding the individual corporation’s existence because it focuses on the human rights of the people
who make up the corporation.296 A desire to adequately protect interests and
actions of human beings that should be protected in all circumstances combined
with flawed assumptions and misunderstandings about the corporate form have
resulted in decisions that start at step two of the analysis when determining
corporate rights.297 By first deciding that the corporation has the right (or is not
intended to have the right), then deciding what beliefs about the corporate form
must be present to validate the decision, the Court has left a trail of opinions
that vacillate among theories of corporate personhoods without ever developing
a clear, constitutional definition of corporate personhood.298 The attention given
to Citizens United has exposed a long-standing problem, and has provided an
opportunity to look at the true nature of the corporation and its relationship to
shareholders, management, states, and third parties.299
Corporate personhood is itself a legal fiction, and the corporate personhood
theories are useful for articulating the relationship of the corporation to society,
but no single theory adequately addresses every scenario.300 The concession or
artificial entity theory only defines the corporation’s legal recognition and existence. It distinguishes it from other entities that are also creatures of state law.
Concession theory is used to define what the corporation is because to do so
acknowledges the initial terms of the agreement. But we must do more than just
analyze the facts of corporate formation in order to appreciate fully how corporations operate in the world. A modern view recognizes the corporation’s many
facets.301 Corporate-personhood analysis cannot end at formation.
Courts must acknowledge that corporations, like natural persons, are not
one thing—the corporation is an artificial entity that exists at the pleasure of the
state and stands alone with independent rights once it is formed. After the corporation is formed through concessions of the state, the corporation has rights,
inherent and earned, and those rights cannot be infringed upon by the state, and
296

Garrett, supra note 5, at 100.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 33; see also discussion in Section III.A.
298
See discussion supra Section III.B.
299
See discussion supra Part II (discussing the true nature of shareholder rights and the role
of corporate management).
300
See discussion supra Section III.B; see also Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 63, at 579.
301
See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 42 (discussing the limits of the concession/artificial entity theory).
297
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are wholly separate from the interests of its founders. Notably, these corporate
rights are not “human rights”—there is no right to religion, right to liberty, or
any other right by default. Under the hybrid theory, a corporation may have access to certain “human rights” in two ways: (1) by including an intent to engage
in activity requiring protection in a corporate charter, or (2) by a state indicating in statutes that it intends for the artificial-corporate person to have such protections.
Corporations are persons, standing alone and independent, without the
rights of the people who comprise them because the corporation was formed to
be separate and managed by external forces.302 The people forming the corporation willfully exchanged control for the benefit of divorcing themselves from
liability, gaining perpetual life, and the opportunity for easier external investments.303 This choice, represented by the contract the people entered into with
the state when they made the affirmative choice of the corporate form, is governed by the corporate charter and limited by the benefits gained.304 The aggregate theory wrongly allows individuals to divorce themselves from business for
protections, and then allows them to superimpose their rights on the corporation, reuniting with the business when desired. For this reason, the rights of the
corporation should be defined by the state, and be based on considerations essential or incidental to the corporate form—not based on the rights of the corporation’s people.305 To expand rights beyond those clearly essential and incidental to the corporate form requires engaging in the two-step analysis.

302
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304
305

See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Part II.
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